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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation considers in turn the role education plays in civil, democratic society; 
the role assessment plays in education; and the role theoretical constructs and cultural contexts 
play in assessment. Then, through literature review, document analysis, and interviews, the 
analysis investigates, identifies, and recommends grounded-theory-derived practices for 
improving qualitative assessment in higher education settings. The process of qualitative 
assessment is understood as being heuristic and continual, requiring re-examination and revision 
to maintain both its validity and reliability. To this end, rubrics are essential to efficiently and 
reliably assessing everything qualitative, whereas the realities of institutional culture and politics 
require adroit leadership from educators and administrators, drawing from manifest praxes in 
organizational theory, management theory, and political theory, to affect progressive change. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
 Assessing learning outcomes is an essential part of establishing both the accountability 
for, and the credibility of, the credentialing function of higher education, and as such, evaluations 
of instructional effectiveness play a central role in accreditation. From modern critical theory, 
higher education in turn may be seen to play a central role in establishing and maintaining 
democracy and social justice within civilization (Giroux, 1997). The methodology of learning 
assessment shapes the curriculum and pedagogy of education, and thereby shapes — indirectly 
— the knowledge base, worldview, and values of society at large (Eisenhower, 1961; Fulbright, 
1970; Giroux, 2005). Therefore, the form and function of learning assessment has significant 
consequences for the human condition: assessment shapes curriculum, curriculum shapes 
education in turn, and finally education shapes society. Thus, what is emphasized in learning 
assessment — both in terms of process and outcomes — becomes, for better or worse, what is 
emphasized in social structures. These social structures then form a feedback loop reinforcing the 
trends in higher education that give rise to them, and, in the present cultural climate, this cycle 
may be considered harmful inasmuch as it leads to regressive tendencies in both education and 
society (Giroux, 2007). 
 Since the advent of modern statistical techniques and electronic computers to efficiently 
utilize those techniques to analyze data and subsequently mine the results for further analysis, 
standardized, normalized, and purely-quantitative methodologies of learning assessment have 
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become predominant in educational practice, with non-trivial social consequences (Giroux, 
2007). Qualitative assessment methodologies have not enjoyed similar advances in 
computational efficiency, and in comparison to quantitative methodologies, remain both more 
subjective and more labor-intensive for all participants. This study is intended to identify 
qualitative assessment strategies and techniques that have either shown promise toward or have 
been demonstrably successful in rectifying this quantitative/qualitative discrepancy of efficiency, 
validity, and reliability, and thereby provide recommendations to offset the imbalance between 
emphasis on qualitative versus quantitative assessments that is found in current practice in higher 
education. By returning meaning and context to a more-central role in learning assessment, a 
renewed emphasis upon qualitative perspectives may address many of the perceived 
shortcomings that higher education has drawn frequent criticism over in recent years (Hersh & 
Merrow, 2005). 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this grounded-theory, multiple-case study is to identify and examine best 
practices in qualitative learning assessment in higher education so that generalizable 
methodological constructs comparable to validity and reliability in quantitative assessments may 
be identified, fostering the transferability of virtuous qualitative assessment techniques to other 
postsecondary institutions and their accreditation processes. 
 This investigation, being grounded in particular contemporary social and educational 
theories that drive the need for this research and shape its initial expectations, takes the form of 
selected in-depth case studies of programs and institutions recognized as being successful at 
qualitative assessment and residing within those theoretical contexts. This study does not attempt 
to investigate the theoretically-assumed broader social consequences of successful programs in 
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qualitative learning assessment, but does make recommendations for how similar program 
effectiveness might be realized at other institutions using either existing programs or evolutions 
of them and relying upon the theoretical constructs that subsequently emerge from the research. 
Theoretical Contexts and Definitions 
 The grounding of this study is based upon the synergistic interaction of two theoretical 
perspectives, critical theory and constructivist learning, as they may guide qualitative 
assessment and as education functions within the present-day socio-political and cultural climate 
of the United States. 
 Critical theory, in its sociological application, is concerned with the dynamics of social 
power and the belief systems that enable and result in that power (Giroux, 1990). In particular, 
postmodern critical theory examines the relationships between authority and injustice that arise 
from capitalism as an economic system, and by extension, a political system. One of the central 
ideas of recent critical theory is commodification — the reduction of all values to market-based 
ones, and how this reductionism is anti-humanistic. Viewing all human activity through the lens 
of the marketplace has dehumanizing consequences — as it considers only extrinsic value at the 
expense of intrinsic value — and historically, moral and ethical systems have arisen (or evolved) 
to counter — or at least limit — such objectifying perspectives of judgment (Giroux). 
 Unfortunately for the public welfare, the social and political climate in recent generations 
has been subject to a feedback loop of materialism wherein social and cultural capital has 
become subjugated to purely economic capital, and the education system has been both a victim 
of, and complicit in, this process (Giroux, 1983). Although the causes of this materialist, anti-
humanist shift may be complex and varied, the necessary participation in and contributions to it 
by traditionally-autonomous institutions of higher education is by no means necessary nor 
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irreversible. Indeed, it has been noted (Fulbright, 1970) that education is a public good which 
should not cede its autonomy to any government; this is the reason, for example, why the U. S. 
Constitution (at least in its original adopted and uninterpreted form) does not grant the federal 
government any powers over education: public education is intended to serve as a check against 
political abuses of power, governmental or otherwise. It is for this reason, again for example, that 
American colleges and universities are accredited not by the federal government, but by 
relatively-autonomous agencies they themselves have established for the purpose. 
 To this end, recent initiatives and directives from the federal government exclusively 
emphasizing quantitative assessments of learning have been viewed as harmful by many 
educators not only because such analyses drive normalization practices that are not respective of 
the dignity and worth of individual students qua individuals (Hopmann, 2008), but because 
standardized testing paradigms have been viewed as corrupting instruction away from 
progressive student-centered models of educational assessment and regressively back toward 
discipline-centered ones (Broadhead, 2002). Furthermore, there are systematic issues raised from 
the reliance upon quantitative measures to inform policy, inasmuch as anything in the social 
sciences that is measured for purposes of control becomes, in response to the exercise of control 
through it, itself malleable and less-reliable over time (Goodhart, 1975). 
 The concern among progressive educators and social critics is that students are becoming 
merely well-trained workers in lieu of becoming critical-thinking citizens (who are also capable 
of doing work) (Asher, 2009). Industry often decries the lack of critical thinking skills in the 
modern workforce, yet it is industry itself that may be seen to drive much of the current trend 
away from critical thinking in the pedagogy in favor of standardized — and thus, typically 
quantitative — performance testing in learning. Increased calls from outside of academia for 
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accountability in higher education must be met by higher education itself, lest other agencies 
take it upon themselves to compel accountability in ways of their own choosing (Griffiths, 
Vidovich, & Chapman, 2008). Thus, studies such as this one may provide useful insight into 
problems many inside higher education might not yet realize we will soon face. 
 As to education theory specifically, constructivist models of learning emphasize the 
emergence of knowledge within the learner, rather than its mere transmission to the learner. 
Among contemporary educational theorists, such models of education — based upon imparting 
the learner-centric skill of seeking and acquiring knowledge rather than a discipline-centric 
database of mere facts — are seen as being more relevant to the increasing complexities of the 
modern world (Nussbaum, 2005). These newer, more modern models, however, are more 
difficult to assess, as they tend to rely upon subtle processes of information creation and 
synthesis within the learner rather than straightforward accumulation and accommodation of 
ostensible, sanctioned facts. Creativity, as a particular measure of learning, is not well-suited to 
quantitative analysis, as both implicitly and by practical definition originality may not be 
standardized (Baker, 2004). 
 Thus there are both individualized reasons, such as personal excellence and development, 
and contextualized reasons, such as the well-being of society at large, to pursue qualitative forms 
of learning assessment, but practical opposition from either pragmatic or political forces has been 
problematic to that end (Carless, 2005; Nkosana, 2008). The likely-unsolvable conundrum 
confronts us: how does one, as an educator, facilitate and then meaningfully assess a student’s 
critical thinking skill using a standardized multiple-choice test? In philosophical practice, the 
resistance of a question to being answered may often be taken as an indicator that the question is 
not well-formed. This study attempts to recapitulate the issue of assessment in such a way that 
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educators and policymakers — as well as other stakeholders — may, from the examples and 
analyses of emergent theoretical constructs, find helpful methods of qualitatively assessing 
learning in reliable and repeatable ways that avoid the negative consequences of purely-
quantitative approaches without introducing negative consequences of their own. 
Delimitations 
 As an example of how subjective judgments may be standardized in qualitative 
assessments, rubrics linked to learning outcomes are already a familiar tool for modern 
educators. The existence of mechanisms such as rubrics suggests that this present research 
inquiry has promising precedent: criteria, levels of achievement, and assorted descriptors within 
those levels all stand as methodological paradigms, upon which those rubrics are built, limiting 
the subjectivity of the assessor. Typically, this subjectivity is further limited by the assessor 
making the rubric available not only to the students whose work will be assessed under it, but 
also to the overseeing institutional accreditation agency. Accreditors may subsequently compare 
and contrast rubrics within and across departments, programs, and institutions pursuant to 
institutional assessment processes. Some instructors, under the aegis of academic freedom, may 
demonstrate some resistance to committing their judgment processes to paper in the manner of a 
rubric, but such habits may be merely reflective of the perpetual tension between academic 
freedom and public accountability, and that issue is not germane to this study. What is relevant to 
this study is that there is already an explicit acknowledgement among educators that consistent 
standards of qualitative assessment are indeed possible, even if the process is still in its early 
developmental stages in academe (Carless, 2005; Hopmann, 2008). 
 In addition, there is a recognized tradition in higher education of writing across the 
disciplines as having value in developing critical thinking skills — the rationale being that 
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showing the ability to express an idea in words demonstrates not only mastery of the intellectual 
content of the idea itself, but also the successful cognitive integration of that idea with other 
concepts in the learner’s worldview (Herrington & Moran, 1992). The problem with assessing 
writing, however, is the significant time and labor required — first in the generation of the text 
by the student, and then in the evaluation of the text by the instructor. More complex instruments 
such as portfolios or live task performances may be even more labor-intensive and time-
consuming. 
Preliminary Research Questions 
 Two avenues of inquiry suggested themselves as starting points for the investigation: 1) 
how can the place and function of rubrics in curriculum and pedagogy be examined to yield 
practical utilities and theoretical constructs that transcend discipline silos, unique institutional 
cultures, and the individual assessors using them, and 2) what practices — technological or 
ideological — exist or may be developed to efficiently manage the workload of both students 
and instructors engaged in qualitative assessments? Further investigation naturally gives rise to 
questions and insights beyond these, as detailed in the methodology and particular case studies 
below. 
Structure of the Study 
 This qualitative study is organized conventionally. After this introductory chapter, a brief 
literature review chapter is presented. The literature review is not intended to be completely 
exhaustive, but provides a broad and diverse survey examining in more detail the various factors 
providing the background and context behind the inquiry. Following the literature review, 
Chapter 3 explains the study’s methodology in all its assorted aspects, addressing and discussing 
the many considerations relevant to a qualitative investigation and the case study format, and 
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how this study operates within them from the researcher’s perspective. Subsequent chapters 
provide the individual, detailed case studies of programs and institutions purposefully selected 
for examination. The final, summary chapter discusses the findings and recommendations of the 
study within the context of the issues raised in both this introductory chapter and the individual 
case study chapters, again from the researcher’s perspective. 
  




CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents a summary of the literature examining the consequences of, 
methods for, and purposes behind recent changes in the policy and theory of liberal, public 
education as the foundation of a democratic society. In this context, constructivist educational 
theory is a long-standing area of research interest in the philosophy of education dating at least as 
far back as the early 20th Century and the work of John Dewey, but its roots may be seen in the 
writings of 19th Century thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and even 18th Century thinkers 
such as Thomas Jefferson. This review summarizes both the theoretical dynamic within which 
education may be viewed as an ontological-sociological technology as well as the unavoidable 
political elements which arise from the structure of that dynamic and to which education is thus 
subjected, for better or worse, in the contemporary cultural environment. This historical and 
philosophical framework may then form the basis of the case studies and “best practices” 
analyses and recommendations that follow.  
 The review of literature is presented as follows. First, an historical overview of the 
controversy surrounding the publication of The Bell Curve is summarized, to provide a 
background for the resulting problem of dehumanizing standardization. Second, the technology 
of education from the theories of John Dewey is examined in its historical context to provide the 
humanistic foundation for modern educational theory and educational reform. Third, from the 
more-recent writings of Michel Foucault, the concept of the learning apparatus is analyzed and 
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developed for application to the problems modern, progressive educational theory faces. Fourth, 
using recent and less-recent research, the architecture of control is discussed for both an 
explanation of its evolution and function, and to show how the goals of education were shifted in 
the middle of the last century away from their traditionally humanistic purpose. Fifth, the 
dehumanizing consequences of overly-quantified assessment practices and perspectives are 
examined and considered harmful, as foreseen by some researchers. 
The Origin and Context of the Problem: Social Darwinism and Sorting 
 The publication, and widespread exposure, of The Bell Curve text (Herrnstein & Murray, 
1994) has established itself as a watershed event in the history of educational theory, for reasons 
its authors may well have intended (Fendler & Muzaffar, 2008). The Gaussian distribution — the 
shape of which has often been interpreted as bell-like — is a mathematical model of probability 
with its own well-established history as a data-derived phenomenon in both the physical and 
behavioral sciences (Stigler, 1986). However, this model has been extended, largely due to the 
influence of The Bell Curve on public policy decision-making, from a descriptive model resultant 
from objective analysis into a subjective, normative model used — or arguably misused — for 
prediction and the accumulation and exercise of social power and control (Fendler & Muzaffar; 
Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
 The “bell curve” is a form of quantitative assessment; in the original presentation, 
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) specifically applied the model to intelligence quotient (IQ) testing, 
and found significant correlations between IQ and race and socio-economic status. The authors 
then used these correlations to — inappropriately without controlled experimentation — not 
merely hypothesize, but genuinely posit, the existence of a causal agency, which they identified 
as being genetic, and therefore racial, in origin (Fendler & Muzaffar, 2008). Although the 
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explicit racism of this methodologically-questionable finding drew much subsequent criticism 
and defense of its particular “biological determinism” conclusions (Gould, 1996; Murray, 1995), 
the general appropriateness of normative, quantitative assessment practices in the behavioral 
sciences became essentially unassailable as a result of the debate. This outcome was because 
although the particular application of statistical modeling to IQ distribution in the general 
population was subsequently examined for flaws in the research design, the validity of the 
mathematical technique was generally accepted by both sides of the debate (Gardner, 1995). 
Such debate, which continues through the present day, centers on the reflexive and subjective 
nature of the reified theoretical constructs of “race” (Smedley, 1998) and “intelligence” (Neisser 
& Boodoo, 1996), and thus their ultimate meaninglessness and uselessness as objective-
analytical tools. The validity of such analysis overall when applied to the inherently at-least-
partially-subjective-and-therefore-arguably-non-scientific phenomenon of human behavior, 
however, has not been examined with as much rigor or vigor (Plucker, 2003). The scientific 
method has certainly established its utility in advancing the understanding of human behavior, 
but given the aforementioned subjectivity, it is naïve — even willfully so — to presuppose 
quantitative methods alone will be sufficient to the task. Scientific methods are only as good as 
the epistemologies and ontologies upon which they are erected, and it is necessary to call upon 
the qualitative from time to time to give meaning to measurement. 
 For the present consideration, the point is that the application of normal probability 
distribution (NPD) assumptions to quantitative assessments at all levels of education is 
ultimately a regressive, rather than a progressive, process (Fendler & Muzaffar, 2008), and this 
process is often deliberately intended to advance a particular political agenda regarding society 
(Murray, 2007). Furthermore, there is a methodological and logical fallacy involved in the 
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circular reasoning behind the numerical definition of a normalized standard to fit to observed 
data and then the assertion that the measurement of that standard represents some instance of an 
actual phenomenon naturally occurring in the population; there is no such thing in the field as an 
“average” person, since “average” is a mathematical construct, not a natural entity. Therefore, 
applying the bell curve model to outcome assessment — learning assessment in particular — 
generates a phenomenological ontology regarding an emergent entity who is conceptualized as 
the Average Student (Fendler & Muzaffar). This categorization, and the sorting schema it 
subsequently inspires, does not necessarily represent an actual, natural state of affairs in the 
population, but is merely a self-serving artifact of the way the analysis is structured. Although 
the resulting tendency toward sorting within the educational system has often been considered 
unwelcome, arguments against sorting have remained historically ineffective, primarily due to 
the influence of politics on the policy process (Hacking, 1990, 2002). 
The Technology of Education 
 The notion of progressive education has its origins in the early 20th Century writings of 
pragmatist philosopher and philosopher of education John Dewey. The theory emerges as an 
extension of the traditional notion of a liberal education (as promoted by Thomas Jefferson, for 
example) into a constructivist model wherein both the individual and society develop in a 
mutually-reinforcing teleological process of increasing complexity and excellence, and hence, 
“progress” (Dewey, 1900, 1916). In such a scenario, the interdependent thriving of both the 
society and the individual operates in a scientific and moral way — a “technology” — to insure 
the well-being of both; this synergistic coupling represents the ultimate expression of democracy, 
as idealized by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. 
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 Central to this growth process is the emphasis that should be placed upon a student’s 
problem-solving skills; in addition to the basic social skills of learning to live and work 
cooperatively with others, schools should place the emphasis on developing the student’s 
judgment rather than mere knowledge, as this is today, perhaps even more so than a century ago, 
the key skill individuals need to flourish in an increasingly-complex society. It is Dewey’s 
position that assessment should be based on an individualized metric (judgment) rather than an 
objective, normalized one (knowledge), and little well-supported rebuttal of this point — much 
less refutation — has been forthcoming in the decades since it was first made. 
The Apparatus of Learning 
 Learning itself constitutes a form of governance. Historically, modern educational theory 
examines the two environmental contexts within which the learner learns (Lewis, 2007). After 
Dewey, the process of learning can be viewed as occurring in a state of tension between the 
developing autonomy and self-realization of the student, and the authority of family and the state 
that impose formal education upon the pupil. This dichotomy recapitulates, on the personal scale, 
the larger power dynamic of (all) society wherein a dialectic between individual autonomy and 
public authority is constantly playing out. The writings of Michel Foucault (1972, 1994) explore 
and develop this general sociological process in much more detail; the key conclusion is that 
standardization — whether it is in curriculum, or pedagogy, or assessment — represents an 
attempt to assert sovereign control through the mechanism of instruction. At times, this process 
may even be characterized as a form of indoctrination, especially in circumstances where a 
particular educational system is designed and implemented to strengthen authority at the expense 
of autonomy (Mason, 2008; Piro, 2008). 
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 In contrast, modern educational principles such as “life-long learning” and “critical 
thinking” are considered valuable tools — and in combination, an apparatus — for increasing the 
power and autonomy of the individual as a member of (an implicitly democratic) society (Lewis, 
2007; Simons & Masschelein, 2008). This individual empowerment may in turn form the basis 
of a general social empowerment — after Foucault — which may then shift authority away from 
oligarchic models of governance and onto the populace directly through the accumulation of 
socio-economic capital. Most saliently, this capital is generated by the learning process itself, 
rather than any particular learning outcome, and is therefore more qualitative than quantitative in 
nature. Naturally, authoritarian governments seek to inhibit or prevent the accumulation of much 
of this capital by the public in order to preserve the concentration of power in the structures of 
governmental authority and thereby perpetuate and increase that authority. 
 As suggested above, the best and most-confirmed path to the manifestation of an 
Aristotelian/Jeffersonian utopian democracy is found in the technology of education set forth by 
John Dewey (Margonis, 2009). The inculcation of autonomous values, rather than the 
indoctrination of authoritarian ones, is the defining, crucial “technology” involved in progressive 
education, and therefore the growth and development, of the individual learner. This process then 
fosters the principle of self-governance under which both the individual student and the 
“multitude” of a public comprised of such individuals operate. Ultimately, education, and the 
form its practical components and practices take, may be conceived of as the defining and 
controlling factor in what form of governance the society operationalizes overall. In as many 
words, education is governance — of both the individual and the society (Piro, 2008). Control of 
education ultimately yields control of government, and, more crucially, vice-versa. 
    15 
The Architecture of Control 
 The natural mechanisms of governance drive governing systems toward authoritarianism 
(Helfenbein & Shudak, 2009), and contemporary developments in information/instructional 
technology and realpolitik are driving new challenges to progressive education as authoritarian 
control becomes easier to exercise and more generally-accepted politically (Masschelein, 2004). 
History demonstrates that the consolidation of power drives the further consolidation of power 
(Nietzsche, 1887); this is the reason that the dispersal and sharing of power as widely as possible 
— through some democratic system of government — is considered the best defense against 
tyranny. Although fully-democratic societies have their own problems of “groupthink” and its 
like, they are still considered preferable to the regressive dehumanization that inevitably results 
from tyranny placing the preservation of state power and control ahead of individual flourishing 
(Piro, 2008). 
 Conversely, for government — even and especially a progressive, democratic one — the 
main challenge in the exercise of its authority is striking a balance between individual and 
general welfare (Simons & Masschelein, 2006, 2008). This is further complicated by 
uncertainties among theorists within the education profession as to how best to address these 
issues (Masschelein & Quaghebeur, 2005), or even if they should be addressed in the current 
political climate (Depaepe, 2007). 
 Another obstacle to progressive educational reform in service to the advancement of 
democratic governance lies in the fact that systematic, methodical attempts to promote 
democracy and democratic principles in curriculum and pedagogy are largely ineffective in the 
face of economic pressures and institutional (government) power as individuals — particularly as 
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capitalism has spread around the world — become preoccupied with fundamental, personal 
economic needs in place of broader cultural ones (Helfenbein & Shudak, 2009). 
 Together, all these factors combine to create an already-significant advantage for 
institutional power to maintain its authority and control, but a new mechanism has been deployed 
to further enhance that advantage: ideology shifts through language shifts (Helfenbein & Shudak, 
2009). Contemporary developments in mass-media technology have allowed public discourse to 
be controlled and shaped in historically-unprecedented ways, and as a consequence, the 
ontologies that individuals devise to understand the modern world are heavily-influenced and 
biased in favor of the controlling agencies from the outset. 
 Modern media permits propagandizing on a level and to an extent never before seen in 
human culture, and ideologues have rushed to embrace its use for explicitly political purposes 
(Helfenbein & Shudak, 2009). Thus, modern political discourse is shaped not by the populace, 
but instead by those who own and thereby control the mass media, and the interests of such 
controlling entities overwhelmingly trend toward the authoritarian. As a consequence of this, in 
turn, the very terminology and vernacular surrounding democracy and the public good has been 
altered to conform more closely to specific regressive values; “democracy” is now defined as 
“choosing leaders” (who must then be dutifully followed) and “free markets” are the antidote to 
the undesirable “socialism” which would annihilate them. And yet, “democracy” is much more 
than picking and then obeying pre-approved candidates in a representative republic, whereas 
“free markets” are little more than an unfettered embrace of the latent merciless, anti-social, 
greed-based hostilities of a competitive economy in lieu of showing a little compassion and 
charity toward one’s fellow human beings. Such thought-provoking perspectives are not taught 
    17 
in present-day schools, by design, and thus real power is kept out of the hands of the governed 
(Popkewitz, 1996). 
 Whereas the primary and secondary school systems are perhaps more beholden to 
government oversight and control, higher education will need to take the lead on the rectification 
of this problem (Popkewitz, 1996). Higher education is (at least for now) subject to less 
legislative and regulatory restriction (cf. “academic freedom,” etc.), as well as serving as the 
primary clearinghouse for the certification of education professionals — teachers and 
administrators — for the public school system. It therefore falls especially heavily upon higher 
education academics to confront and redress the need for corrective policymaking at all levels of 
the educational system, not only by research and study of the problem, but also by first and 
simply raising awareness, both inside and outside of the profession, of the very existence of the 
problem in the first place (Helfenbein & Shudak, 2009). 
 That the governed – either the general citizenry or the professoriate, as the case may be – 
acquiesce to this is a direct consequence of their systematic dehumanization in the authoritarian-
controlled educational system — they implicitly accept a regressive worldview as natural, and 
even desirable, and subsequently fail to actualize their own potential excellences. From the 
perspective of educators and the philosophy of education, this may be viewed as an unethical 
practice on the part of both the society and the individual. 
Dehumanizing Consequences 
  Excessive reliance upon standardized outcome assessment methods may be — in the 
vernacular of systems analysis and best practices — “considered harmful” (Wallace & Graves, 
1995). One of the most insidious consequences of standardized assessments is the normalization 
of failure. Standardized assessments are inevitably calibrated — or “curved,” to use common 
    18 
terminology belying the Gaussian origins of the practice — not only to generate a “normal” level 
of performance around which the majority of “non-deviating” students are clustered in the results 
of the analysis, but also to insure a pre-determined percentage of students have performance 
metrics low-enough to be considered “failures” at whatever the assessment is designed (or less 
charitably, in the case of quantities such as IQ, “purported”) to measure. 
 This practice then engenders an “acceptable” number of resultant failures, and such are 
perceived as an inevitable and unavoidable natural consequence of whatever humanistic process, 
such as education, has been subject to the assessment (Wallace & Graves, 1995). It should not be 
overlooked that “free market” ideology itself furthers and perpetuates this inescapable 
consequence of competition: The existence of “winners” is predicated upon the existence of 
“losers” to provide context, yet this process, though arguably natural (cf. “The Law of the 
Jungle” and so on), is neither necessary for nor appropriate to the existence of an allegedly-
civilized social species such as mankind. 
 In education per se, there are two distinct, but related problems with this (Thayer-Bacon, 
2008). Although the accommodation of outliers performing significantly above “average” is 
often haphazard within educational systems, it is not as urgently needed, as such individuals tend 
to self-actualize on their own initiative regardless of environmental aids or hindrances, building 
self-governance models out of whatever is available. For educators, the primary challenge facing 
these “gifted” individuals is the outward socialization, into a democratic practice, of the 
principles of self-governance in worldview. Without adequate guidance and context, “gifted” 
individuals can fall under the influence of competitive, regressive values systems, and never 
aspire beyond self-centered merely-libertarian perspectives into a full actualization of the 
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principle of “liberty” as “liberty for all” within the context of a mutually-respectful social 
structure. 
 More problematically, the accommodation of outliers performing significantly below 
“average” is practically non-existent within the mechanisms of governance in contemporary 
society. Recently, the mass media have been beset with widespread editorializing calls for policy 
reform in both the social and educational systems because those systems have been producing 
individuals prone to expressing their personal frustrations and failures through fatally-destructive 
acts of public violence against innocent fellow members of their communities; be they family 
members, friends, or strangers, such victims represent targets of opportunity for the dehumanized 
“loser” since the real instruments of oppression are too abstract and too powerful for the lone 
(i.e., improperly socialized as a result of regressive social practices) individual to oppose 
directly. Again, the debate is being shaped by the mass media to serve the interests of the 
controlling governance; the editorializing is often long on blame and short on plausible, practical 
remedies, largely from the deliberate avoidance of engaging with the real issue: the systematic 
depersonalization and dehumanization that has become the accepted status quo of modern 
society. Until the roots of the problem are brought to light — in and through educational reform 
— social reform, no matter how strongly needed, will simply not be possible (Giroux, 2007). 
 Such reform, however, is not without its own challenges (Rose, 1996). The lack of 
centralized mechanisms of control make governance of less-authoritarian models — be they in 
education or society — much more complex undertakings, and ones which require constant 
adjustment and self-assessment. In practical terms, this makes them less efficient to administrate 
and operate, but it may be noted prosaically that this is the price of progress, and that the 
flourishing and added value such practices bring to both the resulting societies and the 
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individuals whose lives and works make up those societies combine to make the undertaking 
worthwhile. 
Summary and Perspective 
 From my training as a philosopher and my experience as an educator I have evolved an 
admittedly-progressive conceptual framework over the years to contextualize the relationship 
between education and society. Analysis of this conceptual framework itself then gives rise to a 
practical framework informing my career goals and educational philosophy. 
 Within my conceptual framework, I have evolved an epistemological framework best 
characterized by the works of Michel Foucault (1972, 1994) and Paulo Freire (2006). These two 
post-Marxist theoreticians are outspoken critics of repressive social orders, and Freire in 
particular is a pioneer of critical pedagogy, a complex educational movement intended to 
promote critical thinking and social justice. Critical pedagogy invites students to examine 
notions such as social space and the resulting genesis of (social) classes (Bourdieu, 1977), and 
how social power dynamics shape and determine society (Arendt, 1998). 
 Philosopher John Searle (1990) has suggested, especially in critique of Harold Bloom 
(and perhaps of the late Howard Zinn as well), that the purpose of critical pedagogy is ultimately 
to create political radicals. From my perspective since the turn of the millennium, given the 
current social and educational climate as routinely reported in the mass media and trade press, 
the intended pejorative quality of this admonition is less than persuasive. The history of human 
civilization finds political radicals at the fulcrum of many of its turning points, and this is as 
often as not a valuable and beneficial thing – as it often leads to progress. Arguments against 
progress — no matter what their provenance — are inevitably flawed, being self-serving and/or 
oppressive (Nietzsche, 1887). 
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 A central tenet of critical pedagogy is the properly-liberating quality of education and the 
consequent/concomitant benefits to the student and society, hence the traditional appellation 
“liberal education.” The dimensions and degrees of this liberation are defined but not delimited 
by the accompanying theoretical framework I have erected for myself upon the aforementioned 
works of John Dewey (1900, 1916) and Henry A. Giroux (1983, 1990, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2007). 
Yet — as critical pedagogy itself will attest — theory is of only academic use without an 
accompanying praxis, and therefore in recent years I have become aware of the need to evolve a 
practical framework for the advancement of education along liberating, rather than oppressing, 
conceptual lines. 
 I have identified qualitative assessment methodologies as being acutely wanting and 
neglected in this regard, as they, by nature, appear to me to tend to empower students and 
educators rather than institutions of top-down control. My research into qualitative assessment, 
initially begun out of merely professional interest in improving my own teaching, has grown to 
become the cornerstone of my entire pedagogical and philosophical outlook toward education. 
 The occasion of writing my doctoral dissertation provides an excellent opportunity to 
explore remediative technologies (to borrow vernacular from Dewey) to facilitate the process of 
progressive educational reform — specifically in line with the problematic trends observed in 
higher education at present. Both in the literature and out in the field, I have begun to more-
frequently encounter lamentations of the increasingly-dire state of education; more and more it 
seems that everyone is calling for something to be done, but few workable solutions are being 
offered, short of those that transfer more control of education out of the hands of academe and 
the publis and into the hands of self-serving institutions of not-directly-accountable economic-
social-political power. 
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 Although it would be presumptive to expect this investigation to yield a wondrous 
panacea for the problem, it is my intention that by addressing what I perceive to be a serious 
omission — either from deliberate, political design or intellectual fatigue and inertia — in the 
understanding of good educational practice, I may at least gain personal insight into a promising 
path for educational reform. Whereas it is explicitly not my intention to generate a harsh polemic 
in this dissertation, it is my explicit intention to construct recommendations and suggest a 
constructive course of action. If, as William Butler Yates famously stated, “Education is not 
filling a bucket, but lighting a fire,” I note that such fires may be effectively kindled not only in 
the minds of students, but also in the minds of their teachers, administrators, and public officials. 
Best Practices 
 In the next chapter, a methodology will be developed to establish the parameters of best 
practices in assessment reform through case studies and applied systems analysis of qualitative 
assessment. A special emphasis will be placed on the progressive and ethical considerations of 
increasing reliance upon qualitative assessment methods and rubrics as technologies to serve 
educational reform better than a purely quantitative, standardized apparatus can. 
  




CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
General Considerations 
 This chapter presents and discusses the methodological considerations of case study 
research both in general and as specifically applied to this research task. As such, it starts from a 
philosophical perspective, elaborates into practical issues, and concludes with a mixture of the 
two. Subsequent chapters consist of the evidence and analysis, concluding with an overall 
discussion of the findings and their implications within the framework set out here below. 
 During the course of a grounded-theory research project such as this study pursues, the 
methodology may naturally evolve. As my investigation unfolded, the initial, expected emphasis 
on case study and interview methodology originally proposed below necessarily shifted to an 
investigation based primarily on document analysis and, due to the poor condition in which some 
of the documents were found, I ended up developing a more informal coding scheme than the 
one I had originally envisioned using. These specific changes are further detailed in an 
addendum to this chapter. 
Philosophical Assumptions 
 The philosophical school of positivism informs both educational and grounded-theory, 
case-study research (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2006). Positivism centers on the essential knowability of 
reality and has been highly instrumental in shaping the modern scientific worldview; it carries 
with it its own methodological strengths and weaknesses, however. Based upon reasoned 
epistemological conclusions about the possibility and obtainability of empirical knowledge, 
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positivism, if relied upon uncritically, can lead to unwarranted assertions of certainty (Popper, 
1959). This in itself forms an underlying theme of the preceding chapters: data may be 
misconstrued as facts, and quantified constructs may be reified out-of-context and thus 
harmfully. All investigations pursuing a grounded theory strategy — wherein theoretical 
constructs are typically emergent from the researcher’s consideration of the data — would 
therefore likewise be well advised to adhere to Occam’s Razor (also popularly known since 
Occam’s day as The Principle of Parsimony, from the original Latin lex parsimoniae) and not 
multiply entities beyond necessity when theorizing or interpreting, and the present research must 
be no exception to this — arguably an original best — practice. 
 Phenomenology in internal context. The discrete phenomenon taken under study herein 
is effective qualitative assessment, where “effective” is used here to mean some forms of 
objective validity and reliability result from the particular practice. Furthermore, within this type 
of grounded-theory research, a case is a discrete and particular instance of the phenomena under 
examination (Gall et al., 2006): here, a program, instrument, or practice of student learning 
assessment (a) at an accredited postsecondary educational institution; (b) that relies 
fundamentally upon a qualitative perspective rather than a quantitative one; and (c) has itself 
been the subject of expert evaluation prior to this study. 
 The units of analysis for the study are emergent from the particular cases, and naturally 
evolve into a coding scheme as a dynamic part of the investigation. Similarly, the focus of the 
study is also emergent from the basic notion of “outcome.” 
 One of the primary research goals in this study is the evolution of a coding scheme that 
will facilitate a subsequent (later-study) factor analysis of the emergent factors characterizing 
qualitative instruments such as rubrics. It is the researcher’s intent that this study may form a 
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pilot from which quantitative interpretations of relevant qualia may in turn be drawn, to lend an 
appreciable aspect of measurability to the employed qualitative instrumentation. 
 Phenomenology in external context. As the nature of the task is interpretive, the role of 
the researcher in qualitative research is inextricably linked to the research itself, given the 
inherently subjective nature of the mode of inquiry (Patton, 2002). Therefore, within this type of 
study especially, explicit attention must be paid to discriminate the etic perspective of the 
researcher from the emic perspectives of the participants and subjects. Given that the researcher 
may be presumed to share a command background and interest with many of those whose work 
forms the object of the study, the differences in these perspectives may be subtle, and perhaps 
even irrelevant to the basic details of the investigation. In the summary phase of this research, 
however, the distinction is non-trivial, and is duly noted as necessary. 
 In the interests of necessary full disclosure, I again acknowledge a proprietary concern in 
matters of educational practice as they exist within the larger socio-cultural context in which 
education and educational systems function. It is my intention that by drawing a clear distinction 
between the political and social concerns motivating the research interest on a personal and 
philosophical level and the actual data that may be obtained, a more scientifically-objective 
framework may be established for the evaluation of qualitative assessment practices in and of 
themselves. As indicated in the previous chapter, I make no secret of the intended significance 
and relevance of this study, but — as per Occam — I must restrict interpretation of the findings 
to only what is demonstrably in evidence from the data and its analysis; researcher self-
awareness is necessary to temper any excessive subjectivity to the interpretation of the findings 
and their meanings. This will be further addressed in the analysis and conclusions in the final 
chapter. 
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Role of the Researcher 
 Peshkin (2000) characterizes the issue succinctly, “The essence of case study design is 
interpretation” (p. 7). From this, four parameters of interpretation may be identified within the 
case study format: (a) where the researcher looks; (b) what data is collected; (c) what data is 
analyzed; and (d) what meaning may be gleaned from the analysis. 
 Where the researcher looks in case study research is usually informed by convenience 
and snowball sampling, and the present research is no exception. Methods such as rubrics and 
writing programs were chosen as initial points of investigation precisely because I was already 
familiar with the basics of rubrics as an instrument and written evaluations as a process, and had 
ready access to background information on recent developments in the theories and practices of 
each as well as a basic conceptual familiarity from which to outline a preliminary coding 
scheme. Further cases then develop as an outgrowth of these lines of inquiry, as well as any new 
lines of inquiry that present themselves to the opportunistic, seeking researcher as the 
investigation develops. For example, my initial interest in rubrics, sparked from casual 
conversation with an instructor colleague, led me to identify an educator with experience in the 
successful application of rubrics to writing. That individual also pointed me toward recent 
innovations in peer-review systems of writing assessment, where I identified two other educators 
with experience and contacts in that technology. All of these individual educators were then 
approached about the possibility of being research subjects in a dissertation project, and they not 
only expressed interest, but also subsequently suggested other individuals and programs for the 
researcher to investigate. Combined with the lack of specific literature on the matter, this word-
of-mouth process quickly convinced me of both the feasibility of, and the acute need for, this 
study. 
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 It should be noted at this point that in educational research of this type, assessment of 
processes is at least as important as assessment of outcomes (Whitson, 1998); the two may be 
considered inexorably intertwined, and in this study are appropriately evaluated as such. 
 In most forms of qualitative social sciences research the scope and extent of the data that 
is collected typically exceeds the scope and extent of the data that is actually analyzed; this can 
be problematic if the researcher eliminates from consideration — either through accident or 
design — data that may hold relevance to the inquiry (Creswell, 2009). For this reason, case 
studies such as this one require review and evaluation from peers and experts at all stages of data 
handling, to ensure that relevant data — or relationships within the data — are not overlooked by 
even the most self-aware of researchers. In addition, such external quality control is necessary to 
establish and maintain a level of trustworthiness in the researcher, lest objectivity become 
compromised from the collapse of etic-emic distance. 
 Finally, the ultimate interpretation of the data is subject to immeasurable bias from the 
researcher’s own etic perspective, and again, ongoing appraisal from peers and experts can 
identify and ameliorate this factor beyond what even the most self-conscious researcher may 
achieve acting only independently, even in light of full disclosure. 
 Overall, I am informed from a philosophical background that looks to Immanuel Kant 
and Aristotle for ethics, and to Plato, Kant, and John Dewey for epistemology. I am particularly 
influenced by the aspect of Kant’s Categorical Imperative that morally requires each person to 
ever be considered as an end, and never merely as a means to an end. This is combined with 
Aristotelian notions of an internal entelechy (loosely, intellect) in all things driving and directing 
each of them toward the virtuous expression of their particular telos (loosely, meaningful 
purpose). 
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 I recognize that these elements are inherently present in all students, engendering a 
Kantian socio-ethical obligation among civilized peoples to not dehumanize students by reducing 
them to mere cold, alienated statistics for some practical purpose, nor to unethically obstruct the 
Aristotelian actualization of the unique potentials within the student. The onus is upon educators 
to facilitate the excellence of each and every student; as discussed above, quantitative 
assessments contribute little to this underlying moral purpose of education, and may even 
obstruct it when misused (either by accident or design). 
 As regards epistemology, I hold a position that acknowledges the universal nature of the 
objects of knowledge — consistent with Platonism — but, transcending Platonism in the 
tradition of Dewey, recognizes that knowledge must be individually constructed by each learner, 
rather than merely recognized as some instance of a divine absolute (a Platonic aeon — 
traditionally translated as Form — as it were). To this process I also add the Kantian perspective 
that although all knowledge bears this subjective character, the underlying framework upon 
which knowledge is constructed has a universal consistency (Kant’s categories of the 
understanding) that renders some measure of coherence to its resultant understandings — this 
leads to the aforementioned positivism underlying the scientific method, for instance. (Positivism 
has delimitations of its own, as any philosopher of science will attest, but they are beyond the 
scope of this present work, and positivism remains a cornerstone of educational research 
regardless.) 
 Similarly, this positivist, constructivist perspective has convinced me that, although the 
process may be unclear at the outset, the research questions pursued in this study are, in both 
theory and practice, answerable. Furthermore, the ethical concerns raised in my mind regarding 
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the proliferation of quantitative methods as the preferred basis of educational policymaking 
effectively require me to address them publicly. 
Strategies and Procedures for Data Collection and Analysis 
 Presentation of the data in the case studies is guided by three processes within the data 
collection and assimilation itself: description, explanation, and evaluation (Gall et al., 2006). 
 Description. The bulk of the case studies consists of thick descriptions of the 
phenomenon (or phenomena) (Gall et al., 2006; Patton, 2002). Herein, it is primarily comprised 
of a detailed exegesis of the history and systems involved in a case, and is typically fairly 
extensive. From this observation and critical evaluation, salient constructs are inferentially 
emergent to the researcher; these constructs are then conceptualized and grouped according to 
their coding — again by the researcher — into themes that define the relevance of the case to the 
research questions. The data collection for this case study research involves a combination of 
(typically public) document analysis — in the form of reports, rubrics, policies, and such — and 
personal communications — in the form of correspondences and interviews as necessary to 
elaborate on the written record and themselves documented in turn within the written record of 
this report. In any sound, rigorous qualitative study, all details of data collection must be 
preserved in such as way to be auditable by the current researcher or future researchers. 
 Publicly-available documents do not require much in the way of consent or approval; 
they are available in libraries, over the Internet, and sometimes even by personal request from 
scholarly researchers. Within this study, it is the correspondence and/or interview process that 
particularly needs IRB scrutiny to protect the educator/assessor subjects. As part of the process 
of rich data collection, individuals being corresponded with or interviewed may provide, either 
from prompting or on their own initiative, information from a perspective or in a capacity that is 
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personal, rather than public-professional — I encountered this phenomenon in casual, collegial 
conversation with colleagues even before the study formally began, and consider it to be at least 
as valuable and informative as “on the record” speech from an official capacity. 
Although the direct incorporation of such informal data into the study and analysis may 
be problematic, it certainly may be used to inform the developing, “on the record” lines of 
inquiry. Therefore, a fairly comprehensive consent form, attached as an appendix to this 
document, has been provided to guarantee informed consent and thereby protect subjects 
engaging in dialog with the researcher as part of data collection. As there are only a few preset 
interview questions to be used across the various studies, where consented to and where 
especially relevant or salient, member-checked edited transcripts of all relevant and/or referenced 
interviews and correspondences are attached as appendices to this manuscript to further 
document for the reader the context and background of anything cited in a given case study. 
In special cases and where specifically requested, individuals, institutions, and/or 
programs are anonymized for subjects’ protection; pseudonyms are used as necessary and 
identifying information in the original records is kept only in a “military-grade” encrypted and 
hash-signed file on the researcher’s own computer system (including archives), with the 
researcher having sole knowledge of the decryption passcode. In general, however, there is a 
large degree of transparency in the formal data collection of this particular study, as the data 
tends to come from publicly-identifiable individuals and programs; this promotes the overall 
credibility and trustworthiness of the research findings. 
 As to the applied methodology, the key component of the research process herein centers 
around the coding of the data, after collection, into a meaningful scheme. This process, 
conducted upon data shortly after it is collected from each source, results in a triangulation 
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dynamic that can direct subsequent data collection. For this study, there are no explicit 
preconceptions about of what the data will consist (as mentioned, there are only a few specific, 
pre-written interview questions at the outset, for example), and therefore it is incumbent upon me 
to “bootstrap” the research questions for each step of the investigation out of the data from the 
previous step. The research begins from a handful of salient areas of interest, but the path of the 
investigation is driven by the data as they are encountered. The unpredictability of this process 
requires me to maintain flexibility when approaching the data, and can cause interpretations of 
the data to periodically need re-evaluation. This re-evaluation can even extend to the theoretical 
framework — critical theory and constructivism — driving the research to begin with, and again, 
as an investigator, I must not be a prisoner of my own ethnography. A good scientist has no 
unchallengeable axioms. (For the pedantic reader: note that this statement is a logical truth, not 
an empirical one.) 
 This stage of each case presentation favors a narrative voice, to present the context in the 
most compelling and engaging manner — that of a story (Patton, 2002). Again, the personal 
perspective and unique ethnography of the researcher inevitably informs and shapes this story, 
but a journalistic tone should be maintained — at least until the concluding chapter. I 
acknowledge — consistent with Plato’s contempt for the arts — the fact that compelling stories 
are in and of themselves not logical proofs or even rational arguments per se, but as there can be 
no meaning with at least a modicum of engagement — a point to which Plato would grudgingly 
agree — evoking empathy in the audience is not an inappropriate strategy when attempting to 
demonstrate the power and utility of qualitative practices. 
 Explanation. Two types of patterns emerge from themes: relational patterns and causal 
patterns. As this research is looking to characterize best practices, from the theoretical 
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perspective, causal patterns are more significant and relevant to the overall goal of 
generalizability, but from the practical perspective, relational patterns can be more robust and 
ultimately useful. Systematic relations between constructs and themes are explored to establish 
plausible effective links from one to the other, and these links are themselves grounded within 
the context established from description. The validity and reliability of the research rest largely 
on the quality of this analysis, and a technique of constant comparison within the emergent 
constructs must be employed to assure relevance and reliability, even if such are only evident ex 
post facto (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and triangulation processes further strengthen these. 
 This stage of the case presentation shifts to, and remains in, an analytic voice, to drive a 
more objective mode of explanatory understanding (Gall et al., 2006). Value judgments, being 
themselves judgments of meaning, are more properly reserved for the concluding chapter and its 
evaluation of the data and analysis. 
 Evaluation. The finishing process of each case involves the integration of the findings 
into the goals and conceptual framework of the research question. At the conclusion of the 
overall study, a second level of evaluative, critical analysis further extends and generalizes this 
process across all the reported research through a mechanism of triangulation (Gall et al., 2006). 
It is at this point that the researcher returns to narrative voice, the extraction of meaning from the 
data being framed in terms of the researcher’s theoretical perspective and goals. It has often been 
said that all observations are theory-dependent, and even grounded-theory research is not 
immune to this fact. 
Validating the Findings 
 From the positivist perspective, then, identification of emergent themes is the primary 
indicator of validity in this study (Gall et al., 2006; Patton, 2002). Central to the research 
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question is how best practices emerge; the lack of a readily-available definition of such a 
construct as “best practices” itself is a significant lacuna this research is intended to address. 
 The specific findings are validated in terms of transferability and generalizability. The 
former is the more positivist undertaking, as post facto analyses can reveal the obstacles and 
successes within individual cases that delimit them, and thereby establish construct validity (Gall 
et al., 2006). The later is the more-artful and less-scientific task, but is still approachable 
systematically (Patton, 2002). One of the guiding principles of the explanatory phase of data 
analysis is to frame constructs within contexts that are themselves well-defined and well-
understood, to facilitate transferability of the constructs to other contexts. From this internal 
validity, an external validity is then be reasonably extrapolated — in the case of qualitative 
research, this manifests specifically as the trustworthiness and credibility of the study. Finally, 
reliability is difficult to establish from a single, essentially pilot, research project of this scope, 
but within the construct of best practices, a quality of repeatability is inherently sought, 
providing guidelines extracted from the valid constructs and themes to allow the same (or 
similar) instruments, programs, and/or pedagogies to be implemented in other postsecondary 
educational contexts, and perhaps beyond. 
Ethical Issues 
 The ethical dimension of this study is threefold. First, confidentiality regarding the 
individual students whose assessment occurred under the programs investigated in this study 
should not be difficult to preserve. Any publicly-available reports or program evaluations, for 
example, appearing as data in a case herein have typically already passed through Institutional 
Review Board approval processes at their originating institutions, and may already be 
collectively anonymized for public release. 
    34 
 Second, as discussed above, the identities of individuals providing personal accounts of 
qualitative assessment practices may sometimes require protecting, depending on particular 
circumstances and preferences. Many participants in qualitative research welcome the 
opportunity to tell their stories (as in Patton above), but many others have reasons to conceal 
their identities, the identities of their institutions, and perhaps even the identities of the 
phenomena under study (the program names, for example). Allowances must be made for both 
those willing to be identified and those reluctant to be identified, and each must be referenced 
appropriately, specific waivers obtained as required, and so forth. It must always be borne in 
mind that individuals reluctant to openly participate in research may have some of the most 
relevant and interesting data to offer (Patton, 2002). To reiterate, this is the area most-typically 
requiring IRB scrutiny to protect the research subjects — the educators and assessors who may 
or may not be speaking in a public capacity and thereby enjoy the benefits of academic freedom. 
 Lastly is the issue of the purpose and nature of this research itself, which is driven by 
critical-theory-based concerns regarding the ethics of current trends in assessment practices and 
the consequences of such trends upon education and society at large. As this viewpoint has been 
openly addressed in the early chapters of this report, full disclosure by the researcher has been 
duly established, and shall be maintained, as the etic and emic perspectives are explored. 
Summary 
 To facilitate coding and analysis, I have chosen to use the open-source Text Analysis 
Markup System and its associated TAMSAnalyzer software.1 TAMS produces machine-and-
human-readable text-based coding and analysis, and also can be used to indirectly annotate 
                                                
1 The source code, documentation, and compiled applications are downloadable from 
http://tamsys.sourceforge.net/ 
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audio-visual media. As my investigation concentrates primarily on document analysis and 
interviews, this tool allows me to freely cross-reference and analyze any and all significant terms 
or themes I identify regardless of the source media. The software is capable of tracking 
numerous emergent themes across large numbers of coded data points, and thereby fosters not 
only analysis of the data, but meta-analysis of the analysis itself. The TAMSAnalyzer software 
package also produces output in a format suitable for displaying graphically, as may be useful. 
 The dynamic process of coding and analysis forms the basis of my investigation, and 
shapes my emergent theories and research questions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, my goal is 
twofold: I am seeking to establish some objective, practical guidelines for the successful 
employment of qualitative assessment techniques (in higher education specifically, but hopefully 
generalizable beyond that realm) as well as identify specific qualitatively-based assessment 
practices that by extension preserve and promote the general purposes of liberal education. 
 To this end, I am seeking to evolve coding schema not only with an eye toward devising 
specific practical recommendations to facilitate higher efficiency in and wider adoption of 
qualitative assessment methodologies in the face of comparable quantitative assessment 
instruments, policies, and programs, but also with an eye toward identifying themes and 
outcomes that have relevance to the socio-political theories motivating my research from the 
broader perspective. 
 It is my intent that this research may serve as the foundation for further, subsequent 
research to extend these preliminary findings, eventually putting qualitative research on an equal 
pedagogical footing with the quantitative research that nowadays is so dominant in educational 
practice. 
The Cases 
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 The next chapters present the particular case studies, culminating in the summary chapter 
which presents the conclusions and recommendations of this report. 
Post-Research Addendum 
 Case study methodology was not as applicable to this investigation as I had originally 
anticipated it would be. In addition, although my initial interview subjects provided helpful 
insights into practical matters – especially with regard to rubrics as they are used in practice – 
my pursuit of further interview subjects willing to address political and administrative issues that 
qualitative assessment programs face was not fruitful. This was for a variety of reasons, all of 
which are relevant to the conclusions and recommendations that emerged from my research. In 
addition, as part of my graduate studies, I unexpectedly obtained a compensated position as a 
research assistant in the Ole Miss Center for Writing and Rhetoric, and this provided me with 
some first-hand experience in the application of rubrics to program assessment, further driving 
the direction of my research and the evolution of my research questions, and this turned out to be 
more informative to my investigation than I had foreseen. 
 Case studies in qualitative assessment ended up being difficult to pursue because of the 
dearth of long-term, successful programs available to serve as subject cases (Miller, 2012). This 
problem is the result of a combination of factors I address in Chapters 4 and 5, but briefly: 1) 
historically, qualitative assessment programs are dynamic and often change – necessarily or 
otherwise – in response to both internal and external factors, and this process of change is 
inevitably highly institution-specific and not particularly transferable due to its anecdotal nature, 
and 2) the politics surrounding qualitative assessment programs are generally difficult to 
navigate, and consequently can frequently be damaging to careers, reputations, and perhaps most 
importantly, institutional culture.  
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 Even though I had sought and received IRB approval2 for my basic interview protocols 
based on the principle that research into the effectiveness of educational programs does not 
typically pose risks for participants, I did not anticipate that there would be as much potential 
danger of personal harm to individuals speaking non-anonymously and on the record about what 
emerged as such a contentious and challenging issue. One successful interviewee in particular 
was able to provide some highly-relevant and timely insights into the current state of at least one 
large-scale assessment program currently underway in American higher education, but due to the 
commercially-proprietary nature of the technology involved, the interviewee and I agreed that I 
am obligated to keep all of that data off the record and out of print. This restriction, however, did 
not interfere with my subsequently seeking publically-available literature that further explores 
the issues that interviewee raised, and then introducing those findings into my research from the 
document source instead. 
 Furthermore, the two problematic factors above can make individuals cautious about 
speaking directly to their experiences with qualitative assessment programs, and on several 
occasions, would-be interviewees politely deferred during the initial contact and instead directed 
me to published essays and reports (and in some cases, books) that reflected or at least were 
consistent with their own experiences as educators and administrators and either directly or 
indirectly addressed the avenues of my research while allowing my would-be subject(s) to avoid 
becoming closely involved with my research. Most of these documents were peer-reviewed, but 
there were also valuable personal insights (not always centrally-relevant, but useful in providing 
context and background) to be gleaned from the more editorially-slanted monographs. 
Consequently, I ended up doing significantly more reading of personal screeds than interviewing 
                                                
2 Ole Miss IRB approval number 11-120. 
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of subjects, but I am convinced that the quality of the resulting data is, if anything, higher as a 
result. 
 Likewise, when I encountered corroborating experiences in my own professional 
experience with qualitative assessment at the Ole Miss CWR, the direction of my research was 
frequently further informed and revised, and I was able to identify new avenues of exploration in 
my document-based research as well as receive basic confirmation of some of my fundamental 
findings. All these considerations shaped the final study, as detailed in the next chapters. 
  




CHAPTER 4: STUDIES IN ASSESSMENT PRAXIS 
AND ESSENTIAL QUALIFYING TECHNOLOGY 
 “Conceptual simplicity, [with] structural complexity, achieves a greater state of 
Humanity” (Shirow, 2004). 
Overview 
 To study assessment without wasted effort, it is important to first establish a conceptual 
framework to address what assessment is and how and why assessment is meaningful. Once such 
cognitive and contextual parameters have been set out, considerations of how the practical tasks 
of assessment are pursued – here, addressing qualitative assessment specifically – may then be 
undertaken more fruitfully. Accordingly, this chapter looks first at the theoretical structure of 
assessment per se, and then studies in depth the rubric as a highly-adaptable tool with an 
effectively-unbounded range of applications appropriate to qualitative assessment purposes and 
situations. From this analysis of the rubric, a general phenomenological ontology – a conscious 
understanding of reality derived from the application of reason to experience – of the assessment 
process may be conceptualized, both internally and externally to any given application. 
The Parameters of Assessment 
 “No truth explains itself” (Holt, 2012, p. 132). 
 A fundamental methodological principle of epistemology – dating from Socrates and 
earlier – is that a necessary precondition for any rational inquiry is that the subject of the inquiry 
have, or at least be temporarily assigned, an identifying cognitive content at the outset of the 
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investigation – i.e., one must have at least have a discrete, working definition of what one is 
investigating before one begins the investigation, in order to meaningfully delimit the 
investigatory process. This definition can potentially change and evolve as part of a feedback 
loop that may or may not develop during the investigation, but with the (to date) singular 
exception of problematic Hegelian-style dialectical, completely-emergent phenomenology 
(which likely lies well outside the scope of something pragmatic such as the present study), the 
questions of essence and existence cannot be considered in any useful depth without determining 
at least some axiomatic notions of one or the other to serve as a starting point for the inquiry. 
This is a known, and perhaps unavoidable, limitation of the faculty of human reason – whether 
that reasoning is inductive or deductive (or even abductive, in the logical-inference sense of the 
term) – and therefore, in accordance with established practices in critical thinking, I must begin 
by seeking a clear conceptualization of what assessment is before I can reasonably proceed 
further to considerations of how a particular method of assessment may be performed well. 
 In addition, my investigations have led me to conclude that many, if not most, of those in 
academia who have engaged successfully with the issues of learning/outcome/program 
assessment have identified some of the key pieces involved (and this often coming only after 
hard-fought struggles), yet no one I have encountered seems to have successfully contextualized 
the whole endeavor of qualitative assessment into a coherent, integrated conceptualization. 
 One reason for this lies in the principle that systems theory describes as incompleteness, 
and the problems of undefinability that result therefrom. The incompleteness theorems first 
published by Kurt Gödel in 1931 that show the limitations of syntax within first-order arithmetic 
– in part by demonstrating undefinability – have been generalized to formal sematic systems by 
later thinkers such as John von Neumann and Alfred Tarski. In brief, in any formal system of 
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symbolic representation of cognitive content (i.e., a language of some sort or other), there are 
propositions which are not provable within that system, and this is in part because the meaning 
of the symbols used is always context-dependent upon the system containing them. Whereas this 
has been proven in purely-mathematical systems, is has also been demonstrated that as a 
corollary of said proof, the semantical concept of truth cannot be encoded entirely within any 
given language or formal system, but instead requires a metalanguage capable of applying its 
own transcendent predicates and positions to the objects of the first-order language (Tarski, 
1983). 
 As a consequence of this second-order principle, purely top-down or bottom-up 
epistemologies are each inherently limited. In the case of top-down models, essence precedes 
existence – in other words, the model has a built-in prejudice in terms of what may be known – 
whereas in bottom-up models, existence precedes essence – in other words, the epistemology can 
only address what is already present in the phenomena. What is called for then, is a blended, 
holistic approach to phenomenological ontology that combines the strengths of each traditional 
epistemological strategy to compensate for the other’s weakness, allowing a phenomenological 
ontology to emerge. 
 To date, one of the most enduring, landmark examinations of the parameters of 
assessment is found in the work of Patrick T. Terenzini (1989). In addition to examining the 
basic logistical issues faced by postsecondary institutions seeking to improve assessment 
practices, Terenzini helpfully lays out an analytical framework for studying student outcomes, 
and a brief summary of his taxonomy is worth including here. 
 As assessing educators, we must begin by addressing three general questions, plus a set 
of particulars within each of those questions. First is the question of purpose: why the assessment 
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is being undertaken (Terenzini, 1989). Although this may seem a pedantic issue, it is genuinely 
informative as responses will generally fall into one of only two categories: assessments of 
teaching and learning, which may be construed as formative matters, and assessments of 
accountability, which may be construed as summative matters. Although it may be argued that 
subsequent advancement of assessment models in the intervening years since the original 
publication of Terenzini’s work has in some sense collapsed this distinction to the point that 
summative assessments such as program assessments may now be considered simply a direct 
extension of learning assessments (the other metric for program assessment being cost efficiency 
and/or cost-benefit analysis) the formative/summative distinction remains useful for purposes of 
understanding and justifying assessment efforts in terms of their ultimate purpose and utility; 
formative assessments drive program modification and improvement, whereas summative 
assessments inform judgments of program worth or value. 
 Second is the question of level: who is to be assessed (Terenzini, 1989). Here, the 
distinction is drawn between individual students and aggregate groups of students. Traditionally, 
assessing individual student outcomes is handled by instructors assigning grades, but programs 
are more likely to be interested in aggregate student performance against some standard for 
summative purposes. Terenzini notes that there are numerous grouping criteria that may be 
relevant to program interests, be they either organizational (course, program, department, 
college/school, campus, system) or demographic (gender, ethnicity, class year, major, residence, 
etc.). 
 Third is the question of object: what is to be assessed (Terenzini, 1989). This is the most 
complex and challenging question of the three, and Terenzini points to a broad four-fold 
typology provided by Ewell (1984) as being both simple and comprehensive: 1) knowledge (both 
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breadth and depth), 2) skills (including basic, higher-order, and career-related), 3) attitudes and 
values, and 4) behavior (both during and after college) (Terenzini, 1989). 
 Together, these three dimensions from Terenzini and eight (sub-)criteria from Ewell can 
encompass the entire scope of postsecondary assessment as it has been and might foreseeably be 
practiced (Terenzini, 1989). Of greater interest to the present inquiry, however, are the various 
problems that even well-designed assessment programs may run afoul of. In examining the 
literature of case studies and analyses of assessment, I have developed a general taxonomy of the 
problems assessment programs face, and an overview is presented here to serve as a basis for my 
further analysis and exegesis. 
 In summary, and as to be detailed subsequently, assessment problems may be categorized 
into four basic types. The first and foremost of these are conceptual problems best addressed by 
Terenzini’s analytical framework: all stakeholders need to share a clear, common, and distinctly-
articulated set of ideas and expectations regarding any program of assessment that is undertaken, 
and although different stakeholders may have particular vested interests – to which varying 
degrees of significance and importance may be appropriately assigned – and whereas the 
development of some of the specifics of this conceptualization must be an ongoing and 
concurrent developmental part of the assessment process, having the conceptualization of the 
assessment firmly grounded from the outset is essential to the assessment’s overall meaningful 
success. 
 The second area of problems concerns measurement. This is a dual issue; at the core, 
observer effects – originally from quantum physics, but nowadays extended to the social sciences 
especially – can be difficult to counter inasmuch as modern scientific methodologies 
acknowledge that even when taking into account other internal and external influences, anything 
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that is measured may be observed to change over time in response to being measured (López, 
2002). More problematically however, measurements of student learning may be either direct or 
indirect. Whereas conventional instructor-administered subject-based examinations and tests 
remain an essential part of teaching pedagogy, for broader assessment purposes direct measures 
of learning are typically performance task-based and are characterized as being “authentic” in 
the sense that they require students to solve realistic problems that are unstructured and have no 
explicit “right” answers (López, 2002, p. 362). These direct measures are generally applied at the 
individual level, at least in their initial data collection. Conversely, indirect measures focus on 
the “perceived” extent or value of learning experiences and typically include instruments such as 
surveys, cohort studies, exit interviews, and trend analyses, and their application is concentrated 
more at the group level. Although the direct measurement scheme is obviously the more 
immediately pragmatic of the two, both direct and indirect assessment measures that go beyond 
the conventional written-answers-to-explicit-questions “test” (as such) are crucial to bringing 
meaning to the assessment process by showing educators not only that students have learned, but 
more essentially what it is that students have learned. Making this distinction is imperative when 
discussing the purpose and goals of student testing at all levels of education.  
 The third problem area for learning assessment programs is the organizational, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly this consideration also applies at more than one level: as with any 
initiative successfully implemented within a organizational environment, an assessment program 
must be internally organized and aligned with its goals and purpose, while simultaneously being 
externally organized to function as an organic part of the institution it serves (Rossman & El-
Khawas, 1987). Each of these two organizational aspects is equally crucial to the success of the 
program. 
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 The fourth and final problem area I have identified is, perhaps as might be expected, the 
political. The institutional culture typical of higher education embraces a unique combination of 
anything-but-unique administrative and social relationships which can make or break any project 
and the people involved with it, often irrespective of the relative merits of either (Shatzky, 2012). 
This is perhaps the most complex and subtle of the four problem areas, but there are a myriad of 
recognized ways to engage it, if the will can be found. 
Instituting “Best Practices” 
 The notion of best practices might be uncharitably characterized as being 
“…indistinguishable from mindless mimicry, the very opposite of academic discovery and 
insight” (Cooper, 2012, para. 8). Though such a dismissive judgment is perhaps overly harsh, it 
also may be indicative of the gulf that has developed in recent years between what has now 
become the default perspective of administrators and that which has traditionally been held by 
faculty in regard to what is valuable in higher education. Both factions may rightfully be viewed 
as being results-oriented, and yet they may find themselves at odds over what results are to be 
desired and prioritized within the institution. In the literature and in interviews, I have found that 
best practices are often recommended solely on the basis of their ability to reliably produce the 
desired outcomes, but these recommendations are often free of contextual or theoretical 
groundings that do not rely upon some form of circular reasoning backwards from those 
outcomes to begin with. The data is taken, and outcomes are defined and delimited by what may 
be gleaned from that data, but rather than forming a dynamic, evolving feedback system, the data 
may begin to drive the parameters of assessment by themselves. Ethical and pragmatic 
considerations demand that this reflexive mechanism be improved upon in order for the 
assessment to be authentic and meaningful instead of merely self-serving. 
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 Ultimately, any recommended best practices will naturally share certain essential 
properties derived from practical experience that identify those practices as being effectively 
“best” (and oftentimes this may simply be the result of trial-and-error testing in an environment 
of institutional Darwinism), the foremost among these being repeatability and transferability 
(hence the “mimicry” pejorative above). The principles of validity and reliability, as applied to 
the analysis of assessments and their instrumentation, can support this kind of portable utility and 
thereby establish foundational qualities for effective and valuable assessments to have in 
common, even if the assessment programs themselves remain highly institution-specific 
(Terenzini, 1989). I shall first address the foundational issues of how to establish qualitative 
assessment best practices in the context of “bottom-up” technologies, and then address the 
contextual and environmental challenges that assessment programs face using “top-down” 
methodologies; in this way, each of the two aspects can compensate for the limitations of the 
other, and as a result a coherent, integrated, and grounded theory can be realized. 
 Ewell (1984) points out that the “appropriate” outcomes of higher education were once 
“relatively few and well agreed upon” (p. 18)3 inasmuch as they consisted of a straightforward 
                                                
3 The only available extant copy of the document appears to be a PDF composed of scans 
of photocopies; the pages of this PDF have been numbered sequentially – often with numerals 
superimposed on the images – to include other parts of the document history and context, such as 
copyright and printing notices, database and filing records, and so on. This compiled document 
apparently now forms the only surviving version of the source text to be found. In many cases – 
in this source and ones in similar condition – the original page numbers also are sometimes 
obscured or missing in places, making the version prepared for archiving the most-reliable 
version. Thus, I cite the revised page number here in lieu of the original. 
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combination of character building through a traditional liberal education with intellect building 
through scholarship in a chosen academic discipline. In recent decades, however, this 
conceptualization has changed and evolved in complexity to the point that new dimensions of 
educational outcomes must now be invoked. Such dimensions may be understood as threefold 
(and Ewell’s order is telling, p. 21): institutional objectives, student educational goals, and the 
needs of society and other third-party stakeholders. It should not be overlooked that Ewell’s 
notion of appropriateness is closely tied to a principle of accountability that was relatively 
innocuous and virtuous in the early 1980s, but which has taken on a different political character 
since the turn of the millennium – a character that is now focused on exerting external control. 
 Ewell (1984) does not fall into what I would characterize as the “trap” of accountability 
however, recognizing that there is a crucial distinction between the empirical changes produced 
in the student and the values placed upon those changes both inside and outside of the academy. 
As educators, the effective delivery of learning to our students is and should be always our 
overriding concern. As discussed in previous chapters, within the modern political climate 
outside academe the primacy of this goal is increasingly subject to alteration and repurposing in 
order to serve special interests at the expense of the public interest. As further analyzed below, 
the inferences that may be drawn about student learning shape and are shaped by the interests 
that are being served in actual practice. Although there will and should always be pressure for 
external conformity in postsecondary outcomes, practical purposes drive the need for explicit, 
institution-specific goals to be identified and acted toward instead of surrendering that function 
to calls for and from external conformity. 
 This distinction then invites the question of what, precisely, a “learning outcome” is or 
can be (Ewell, 1984, p. 16). The subtleties involved are non-trivial: on the one hand, the change 
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characterized as “learning” can be construed as a relative increase in a student’s knowledge or 
abilities from their initial state, but on the other hand, the change that carries the label “learning” 
can be measured against an absolute scale of proficiency independent of the student’s initial 
aptitude level. Each of these metrics may be informative in its own right, but their respective 
utility depends on the specific analytical and assessment purpose to which each may be applied. 
 In addition to the issue of establishing the baseline reference against which the learning 
(or progress) will be construed and measured, assessments (learning or otherwise) may be either 
norm-referenced or criterion-referenced. The former refers to comparisons of performance 
against that of peers (either internal or external to the context), whereas the latter refers to 
performance as measured against objective standards (which may also be either internal or 
external to the context). Although elements of both may be relevant to an assessment 
undertaking, referencing criteria rather than norms is more foundational to the process of 
phenomenological ontology that in turn grounds the assessment conceptually within the 
discipline and the institution. Addressing primarily issues of standardized (and hence, more-
quantified) testing, Harris (1986) tells us: 
You can compare your students to other students nationally on standardized tests without 
having definite educational goals, stated expectancies, or outcomes. But without such 
goals, you can’t be sure the tests reflect your curriculum. You and your colleagues may 
also be interested in how your students change in terms of beliefs, interests, attitudes, 
values, and behaviors. There are various commercially available inventories to reflect 
these things. Yet again, without relatively clear student development goals, you won’t 
know how to select the inventories that fit your institution. (p. 22)4 
                                                
4 Note 3 applies to this document as well. 
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This necessary contextualization of conventional test-based assessments extends even more 
crucially to qualitative assessments, especially those developed from within the institution itself. 
 Although Ewell (1984) asserts that a lack of administration-driven incentives for the 
faculty is the major obstacle to effective assessment reform, he provides several short case 
studies of successful programs (and the other effects on their respective institutions) in the 
second chapter of his report. As his report was subsequently used as a basis for recommendations 
made by the United States Department of Education to American colleges and universities, the 
significance and influence of his findings has been considerable. 
 Most notably, there are three key takeaways whose relevance has not diminished in the 
intervening decades. First and foremost, Ewell (1984) finds that assessment programs do not 
necessarily require high costs, specifically a “massive infusion of external resources;” instead, 
Ewell contends that much of the cost of reforming the assessment process may be borne by 
realigning existing internal assessment activities (p. 17). I have a few reservations about this 
assertion, however. Critical thinking invites us to always consider the agenda behind and the 
intended audience for an argument, and the reader cannot completely divorce Ewell’s conclusion 
from the potentially propagandistic purposes that commissioned his research initially and to 
which it may have been put. If an implicit goal of Ewell’s report is to introduce a call for 
assessment reform and encourage its embrace, addressing the easiest and obvious objection 
(“But it’s too expensive!”) directly makes good rhetorical sense. This in itself, unfortunately, is 
insufficient to fully substantiate the truth of the claim that reformed, proper assessment is not 
particularly expensive and merely requires some re-allocation of existing resources. Indeed, the 
contemporary trade press and innumerable educator weblogs frequently devote a large potion of 
their attention to the significant resource costs qualitative assessment programs incur nowadays 
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(see López, 2002, in particular). Writing in 1984, perhaps Ewell is being overly-optimistic and 
not disingenuous in anticipating that the costs of assessment could be expected to remain 
constant and modest even in light of unforeseeable changes in technology and (external) 
stakeholder expectations that drive corresponding change in the whats, whys, and wherefores of 
learning outcomes. 
 Secondly amongst Ewell’s takeaways is his point that “effective” efforts must be both 
“institution-specific and participatory in character” (p. 17). This point is well-supported by other 
research and even other management contexts (as detailed below), but again, the critical thinker 
might well take note of the following quote: 
Neither government nor the research community can hope to impose solutions – no 
matter how well informed – if faculty and administrators have not first internalized the 
logic of these solutions through their own evaluations and experiences. (pp. 17-18) 
Although it appears upfront enough, this statement is highly problematical as it reinforces what 
has now been shown to be a contentious assumption that “top-down” implementation is 
desirable, or even feasible, as the ultimate driving factor in assessment programs. To a close 
reading of the subsequent chapters, it emerges that Ewell clearly acknowledges the necessary 
“bottom-up” nature of the process, but still his choice of the verb “impose” remains. Thus, 
Gallagher (2011) identifies something from policy literature bluntly labeled “the implementation 
problem.” This “problem” results from the practical fact that “Policy directives… do not execute 
themselves” but instead must be implemented by those farther down – often much farther down 
– in the operational/managerial hierarchy from those who issue the directives and implement 
them by “remote control” (Gallagher, p. 463). Darling-Hammond (1997) notes that such top-
down management tactics are especially prone to failure in an environment of academic freedom 
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due to processes of interpretation, redefinition, and even outright subversion influencing the 
implementation. In turn, Gallagher explains, neoliberal education reformers at the top of 
administrative hierarchies respond to the “problem” by attempting to tighten administrative 
control with forced programs of scripted instruction, packaged curricula, and standardized testing 
(p. 463). From Gallagher’s perspective, all these control mechanisms become in practice 
obstacles to the processes of education and assessment, processes which are in the final analysis 
based fundamentally upon teacher-student relationships and not upon instructional technologies. 
In addition, Ewell (1984) tells us 
Many educators argue that the very nature of the higher-education enterprise effectively 
precludes improvement through increased external accountability. (p. 11) 
Although these two factors from Ewell and Gallagher may be convincing to some, the “facts on 
the ground” (to borrow a popular contemporary idiom) in a higher education system that is 
increasingly beholden to neoliberal ideologies are best characterized by Ewell (1984) himself: 
What we are now increasingly being asked to demonstrate is nothing more than that for 
which we in the past have had the hubris to claim credit. (p. 12) 
And this perfectly encapsulates the crux of the matter. 
 Ewell (1984) goes on to describe external standards applied to the academy as being 
“alien” and “counterproductive” as they are antithetical to the very ideas of academic freedom 
and inquiry – traditionally, academic standards have been maintained by the individual 
disciplines organized within academia (p. 13). I note that the etymology of the word “discipline” 
is no coincidence here. 
 Additionally, Ewell (1984) invites us to consider the traditional role of scholarship in not 
merely building “society’s store of knowledge” (p. 13), but in driving civilization forward to new 
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levels of self-regarding and self-improving, while simultaneously producing a similar manifest 
excellence in the individual learners whose efforts build and advance civilization as a whole. As 
thus envisioned, education is indeed a bottom-up process of individual- and civilization-building. 
Tools for the Job 
 The rubric is arguably the instrument of choice to use when pursuing qualitative 
assessment in any form; Stevens and Levi (2005) describe the rubric with disarming simplicity as 
“a scoring tool that lays out the specific expectations for an assignment” (p. 3). The advantage of 
rubrics comes from combining the utility of being applicable to an unbounded range of 
assessment scenarios with the virtue of establishing objective criteria for assessing – criteria that 
are themselves subject to review and evaluation. Rubrics are initially devised using a top-down 
internal methodology in order to delimit and define the outcomes under consideration, but are 
subsequently effectively applied – and revised as may be necessary – in a bottom-up feedback 
process directly driven by those who are employing the tool. As Stevens and Levi provide a 
definitive overview of the process of constructing a rubric, I shall include a brief, annotated 
summary of their guidelines as framework here. 
 The process of constructing a new rubric to use in an assessment (or editing/repurposing 
an existing rubric) first begins with a task description (Stevens & Levi, 2005). From the outset 
then, the instrument aligns itself with performance-task-based assessment rather than fact-recall-
based assessment. This focus is appropriate to qualitative assessments that explore not merely 
whether or not students have mastered a body of knowledge, but to what use students can put 
that knowledge mastery. Typically, this part of rubric design is addressed by assigning an 
appropriate title to the rubric and, space permitting, including an explicit statement describing 
the task to be assessed. It is important not to omit or gloss this element, as it may be very 
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informative to both the students and external stakeholders who seek documentation of the 
assessment process in order to understand the context within which the rubric is, was, or will be 
applied. 
 The second part of rubric-building consists in devising a scale that reflects various levels 
of qualitative achievement and that may be used for quantitative analysis (Stevens & Levi, 
2005). As this scale is by default an objective one, the associated learning outcomes may be 
considered standardized. This point is highly significant, as it is essential to rebutting criticisms 
from the more purely-quantitative assessment camps that qualitative assessment lacks sufficient 
standardization. The real issue present is that, in the institutional context, this rubric-driven 
standardizing is driven from the bottom up instead of the top down, and yet in practical terms 
this does not make any developed standard any less of a standard, merely less of a mechanism 
for wielding authoritarian control within or over the institution.
 Stevens and Levi (2005) make the point that the achievement scale need not be overly-
granular; a five-point scale is usually preferable to a ten-point one in terms of the ease and speed 
with which it may be applied, and my experience suggest that a four-point scale may be better 
still due to the fact that it forces every rater to actively evaluate each criterion and subsequently 
score it either above or below the mathematical, midpoint average. Typically, the scoring should 
be normalized (by design and in practice) in such a way as to generate an average value for each 
criterion in the middle of the four-point range, but that average only emerges from the data 
analysis – raters are not allowed to lazily assign it. In this way, the “average” level of 
performance is more honest, as it is necessarily an artifact that emerges as a consequence of an 
evaluation yet is not and cannot be an explicit choice by a rater. 
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 Generally, even a three-point rating scale is usable (extending even to Fail/Pass/Honors 
conventions, for example), but a two-point scale is not (Stevens & Levi, 2005), as scales this 
short can lack the ability to make meaningful distinctions in performance. If all-or-nothing 
measures are desired, it is possible to devise component checklists within each criterion of the 
rubric and then sum them to yield a general level of performance for that criterion, selecting 
different levels of student competence on each sub-criterion if particular aspects of student 
performance within the overall criterion vary. 
 Although Stevens and Levi do not explore it in detail, it should be noted that for 
alternative purposes performance levels that are defined relative to the baseline (pre-treatment, 
i.e., pre-learning) proficiency of the individual student(s) are often possible to devise and apply 
to different outcome considerations. Indeed, one of the advantages of performance-based 
assessment is that with sufficient data capture (retaining written work, retaining recordings of 
presentations, etc.) it is possible to re-assess historical task performances using completely 
different rubrics in service of completely different outcome assessment – a possibility largely 
precluded in conventional, multiple-choice-based standardized testing. For example, at the Ole 
Miss Center for Writing and Rhetoric we have from time to time in recent years re-assessed our 
collected archive of student writings in terms of different program outcomes, devising new 
rubrics as necessary to let us identify emergently-relevant historical trends in different qualia 
that may be found in our growing repository of student writing samples. The subsequent findings 
of these re-assessments have then informed decisions about pedagogical revision within our 
writing program. 
 The third part of rubric-building consists of determining the “dimensions” of the 
assessment (Stevens & Levi, 2005). These factors should be identified and labeled with nouns, 
    55 
not qualifiers, and are chosen by the educator(s) to capture the essential qualities of the 
performance task as may be formulated in the (learning) outcomes. 
 It is here that a rubric gains (or not) the basis of its validity. The meaningful 
correspondence – or lack thereof – between the what is assessed and what is learned hinges upon 
the appropriateness and fitness of the dimensions of the assessment to the sought outcomes of the 
educational process. I have done some preliminary research into applying factor analysis to this 
part of rubric design to investigate whether or not a rubric’s dimensions may be reliably 
constructed to be functionally orthogonal to each other, and the initial results are promising. Yet 
I only mention this in passing here for completeness, as even the most mutually-orthogonal of 
assessment criteria/factors may be still be invalid if the design of the rubric is not properly 
grounded in a sound phenomenological ontology, and so I shall further examine the issue of 
validity in a moment. Here, I simply note the direct correspondence between the 
phenomenological ontology that the learning pedagogy is intended to foster in the learner(s) and 
the optimal structure of the rubric that is devised to assess that learning. This is the crucial aspect 
of rubric design and use. 
 The fourth and final part of rubric-building consists of providing the descriptions of the 
various levels of performance within each dimension (Stevens & Levi, 2005). Stevens and Levi 
recommend that the highest level of performance should be explicitly described, with lower 
levels being subsequently codified in relation to this benchmark as desired, and students (as well 
as raters) typically report having this expectation set out for them plainly is informative and 
useful (L. Schrock, personal communication, Spring 2012; S. Flaschka, personal communication, 
Spring 2012). Rubrics which concentrate only upon specifying the highest level of performance, 
and rating students in terms of how their performances measure up to this single standard are 
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typically classified as scoring guide rubrics. However, rubrics that describe all the levels of 
performance – from the highest to the lowest – are more common, and this is because although 
scoring guide rubrics are simpler to write (Stevens & Levi, 2005), rubrics with more detailed 
descriptions are easier and faster to use (S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012). 
 Time-efficiency is a key factor in all aspects of rubric use. Stevens and Levi (2005) 
mention that the time invested in devising and writing the rubric is quickly recouped in using it. 
This is because a well-designed rubric can function as a form of checklist, enabling the user to 
avoid the need to write the same notes over and over from paper to paper (for example). The 
more detailed the rubric, the faster it is to work through in applied use. 
 Beyond the emphasis on time-efficiency, Stevens and Levi (2005) also broadly address 
the general question of why rubric use is desirable and valuable, identifying essentially six 
different elements of a comprehensive rationale. Pursuant to their book’s goal of promoting 
rubric use, they frame their justifications in wholly practical terms without touching much upon 
the theoretical and conceptual considerations that might also be involved. Such considerations, 
however, are highly relevant and it is a simple-enough matter to identify and understand them. 
 Extending the time-efficiency paradigm, Stevens and Levi note that the ability of the 
grader to rapidly process the assessment consequently facilitates providing timely feedback to the 
student, and this timeliness is viewed as being essential to the learning process (2005, p. 18). 
Furthermore, as students tend to make the same or similar mistakes on any one assignment, 
predictable notes may be incorporated into the rubric’s dimensions to specifically address these 
mistakes or shortcomings in the desired outcomes. Stevens and Levi do not explore it in much 
detail, but this design consideration specifically aligns the instrument – the rubric – with the 
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assessment of explicit learning outcomes, and the relevance of a rubric’s dimensions to its 
validity arise from this congruence. 
 In addition to timely feedback, the rubric can also provide detailed feedback on 
performance, as the specifics within the evaluated dimensions can give students categorical 
explanations for why an assessment was scored the way it was (Stevens & Levi, 2005). Students 
often report that they struggle in their comprehension not only with course content, but also with 
instructor expectations, and the more details a rubric includes, the more clearly instructor 
expectations may be understood (A. Myatt, personal communication, Summer 2012). 
 Stevens and Levi (2005) suggest that an instructor retain copies – either physical or 
electronic – of student-submitted originals for the purpose of tracking student performance over 
time (even using perhaps a different rubric), but personal experience shows that such document 
retention and preservation practices can also be essential in preventing student challenges to 
assigned grades based on altered, counterfeit versions of the work offered to one’s superiors as 
“evidence” of grader error. Caveat lector. 
 As an extension of the feedback process, rubrics encourage critical thinking by helping 
students self-analyze (Stevens & Levi, 2005). It is a basic truism in education that self-
assessment is a prerequisite for self-improvement, and such self-improvement is often an implicit 
– if not explicit – learning outcome in its own right. 
 Equally important, however, is the fact that rubrics facilitate communication with others 
in the instructional process. Stevens and Levi (2005) note that this is particularly valuable in 
regards to the work of both teaching/graduate assistants who have been assigned to instructors as 
graders and to the efforts of any tutors who might be involved in the pedagogy. Clear and 
meticulous communication of outcome expectations to third parties functioning in intermediating 
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roles between instructors and students is essential to providing an effective education to those 
students. The crucial nature of this communication may also be extended to new faculty and 
adjuncts who may lack their more-senior colleagues’ long-term familiarity with a given 
curriculum, as well as among those senior colleagues themselves when there is a pre-established 
departmental goal of delivering a common curriculum. In practice, this consideration applies 
primarily to lower-division undergraduate courses more than upper-division or graduate-level 
ones, and as such, it is even desirable on occasion to have a unified rubric employed department-
wide pursuant to curricular consistency in 100-level instruction. In the Ole Miss Center for 
Writing and Rhetoric, for example, as much of our freshman composition instruction is handled 
by adjuncts and inexperienced graduate students, a set of core-faculty-devised common grading 
rubrics is an essential part of our instructional quality control and outcome reliability (or 
consistency). 
 In a similar vein, a good rubric can help refine our teaching skills (Stevens & Levi, 
2005). Institutional and program assessments can analyze scored rubrics to gain insight into the 
effectiveness of teaching and pedagogy. Whereas some instructors may be put on the defensive 
at the suggestion that they be judged (partially) on the basis of their students’ learning, it should 
be noted that a post hoc examination of scored rubrics can provide more reliable insight into 
student learning than the traditional, problematical student evaluations of instruction do, having 
removed the opportunity for students to introduce bias in their responses to instruction (such as 
might be present, intentionally or not, in replies to survey questions). This is admittedly a more 
indirect method of assessing instructor effectiveness, yet it also more objective and is therefore 
more desirable: rubrics provide tangible evidence of student learning (when it occurs). The 
implications of this for evaluative purposes are clear. 
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 Lastly, rubrics level the playing field academically (Stevens & Levi, 2005). Rubrics may 
be used in any and all disciplines, and provide a mechanism where diverse outcomes in a wide 
variety of tasks, each variously relative to institutional goals, may be evaluated in a similar 
manner. Beyond specific course/degree requirements, rubrics can yield insight into cognitive 
conceptualizations and phenomenology that signify mastery of a subject and are transferable to 
other disciplines and academic/non-academic applications. This is because rubrics can address 
cognitive contexts, backgrounds, and biases in ways useful to an administrative understanding of 
the learner and the learning process. Furthermore, consistent, broadly-applied rubric use can 
yield a proverbial “paper trail” of a student’s learning, and this has relevance at every scale 
ranging from the individual learner’s growth and development as a student up to the institution-
wide accreditation process and beyond, documenting the tangible education as it occurs. 
 Within the labor of constructing (or perhaps even merely re-evaluating) a rubric, the 
process may be divided into roughly four stages (Stevens and Levi, 2005). I use the word 
“roughly” because experience shows that it is not necessary to be completely pedantic about the 
task of rubric construction, nor are the stages in practice necessarily as distinct and clear-cut as 
Stevens and Levi would have them in theory. Nonetheless, the general four-stage method 
consists of reflecting, listing, grouping and labeling, and finally application. Taken in total, this 
progression forms an integrated phenomenological ontology – one that should reflect in 
microcosm the larger curricular content. 
 The foundational exposition of this phenomenological ontology may be found in the 
questions Stevens and Levi provide to prompt the initial reflection stage. Although the 
components considered at the outset do not bear any necessary correspondence to the final 
dimensions the rubric embodies, they can guide and delimit the assessment context as thoroughly 
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as may be desired (Stevens & Levi, 2005). By analyzing this initial ontology, we may gain 
insight into the broader value and meaning of the task, the assessment instrument, and the 
outcome(s) as an educational technology. The questions Stevens and Levi pose to us in the 
beginning stage of rubric design are as follows: 
• Why this assignment? 
• What is the history of this assignment? 
• What is the place of this assignment within the curriculum? 
• What are the skills required for this assignment? 
• What is the specific task of the assignment? (And does it have component tasks?) 
• What is evidence of accomplishing the task? 
• What are your highest expectations of performance? 
• What are the failure modes? (Historically or expected?) 
It is of course possible and perhaps even desirable to rephrase or otherwise contextualize these 
basic eight inquiries for particular disciplines or programs, yet upon examination it becomes 
clear that any conceivable educational or institutional outcome can be subsumed under one or 
more of these focused questions. The correspondence of the structure of the Stevens and Levi 
ontology to that put forth by Terenzini reflects an underlying commonality addressed by their 
respective phenomenologies: by considering, from within a clearly-identified conceptual 
framework, all the aspects of what the desired outcomes are and how those outcomes may be 
understood, we as educators can assess any learning process in a reliably systematic manner, and 
that system will have certain individually-specified, yet generally-universal properties that are 
shared across inter-disciplinary and inter-institutional environments. This yields the validity of 
the rubric-as-instrument, as discussed further below. 
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 The subsequent stages of the method all represent refinements and extensions of the basic 
schema set out in the beginning, foundational stage of reflection. The answers to the reflective 
prompts then inform the next stage: listing (Stevens & Levi, 2005). The purpose of the listing 
process is to inferentially identify discrete themes and concepts, from a constructivist model of 
learning, that an assessment may address. The listing stage is perhaps the most problematic in the 
process, as it requires the instructor(s) to confront the sometimes-dreaded notion of learning 
objectives. As a consequence, this is often the place in any assessment project where faculty 
resistance is greatest (Banta & Blaich, 2011; Reed, Levin, & Malandra, 2001; Tagg, 2012), and 
so I will examine it in more detail below. For now, I simply note that the opportunity to take 
ownership of the delineation and exegesis of learning objectives represents academic freedom at 
its most fundamental: the faculty may decide for themselves what shall be taught by clearly 
specifying to the administration what shall be learned. Good leadership within the institution is 
required to facilitate the embrace of this perhaps most tedious and pedantic of tasks, yet retaining 
ultimate authority over learning objectives can form a strong bulwark for supporting a faculty’s 
role in shared governance and maintaining the institution’s quality of scholarship. 
 The listing process is not without its own guidance. In practice, learning objectives flow 
naturally from contemplation of the eight questions from the previous stage, as well as being 
informed by curricular/catalog course descriptions and discipline-specific program goals 
(Stevens & Levi, 2005). Once the learning objectives have been identified and described in a list, 
they may then be codified in the subsequent stage of grouping and labeling. 
 Ideally the objectives should be assigned to thematically-similar groups, and the 
dimension of each group should be as orthogonal as possible to those of all the others; in other 
words, we want to group like with like and make certain that the resulting groups are distinct and 
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discrete, with little overlap. This process is more art than science, but may be assisted with 
formal tools such as the aforementioned factor analysis and, most importantly and as indicated 
above, considerations of the instrument’s validity. The former element is more post hoc to the 
assessment process and plays a larger role in the revision process a rubric should be periodically 
subjected to – such revision being central to the latter, less-formal element. Validity is a complex 
subject in assessment, and there is much that has been written addressing its overall challenges, 
but for the moment my focus will stay on the technology of rubrics in and of themselves. 
 Besides grouping the outcomes into an ordered structure, the various levels of 
accomplishment in performance should be labeled (Stevens & Levi, 2005). In the case of a 
holistic scoring guide rubric, the individual performance criteria for each level should be 
specified in order to compensate for the potential lack of detail such rubric offers the student in 
comparison to a more-elaborate multi-level rubric (S. Smith, personal communication, Summer 
2012). The combination of these two grouping and labeling mechanics then yields the traditional, 
structured form that gives a rubric its categorical schema. In all cases, designers should bear in 
mind that the number of groups multiplied by the number of labels yields the total number of 
elements the rubric will span, and this number should be large (and therefore detailed) enough to 
make the feedback meaningful but not so large (and therefore complex) as to make the feedback 
difficult to comprehend. 
 The final stage of rubric-building (or revision) is the application of the chosen schema to 
the design and layout of the rubric grid (Stevens & Levi, 2005). Arranging the factors in a grid 
layout facilitates the ease-of-use and clarity of the rubric by generating a matrix that recapitulates 
the ontology the rubric is intended to represent, and this correspondence in turn is central to 
ascertaining the instrument’s validity, as below. 
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 Some further detail on the differences between scoring guide rubrics and multi-level 
rubrics is appropriate here. Of the two, the scoring guide is the simpler design (Stevens & Levi, 
2005, p. 39). On the plus side, a scoring guide gives greater flexibility in response, and is better 
suited to real-time grading of performance tasks. On the minus side, a scoring guide does not 
provide particularly detailed feedback unless more time is invested later (after the task is 
completed). For more-comprehensive assessments, a multi-level rubric is preferable (with 
Stevens and Levi recommending 3 to 5 levels for each criterion, p.79), as such rubrics can 
combine detail with efficiency. Since devising a multi-level rubric requires specifying a greater 
level of detail under each criterion, it can be slower to create than a comparable scoring guide, 
yet the resulting tool is also faster in actual use, since scoring on a multi-level rubric can often be 
reduced to simply marking the corresponding levels of performance on each criterion in the pre-
written matrix. In contrast, scoring guide rubrics allow for greater individualization of the 
feedback along with greater flexibility in the form that feedback may take. Typically, a scoring 
guide rubric gives a student a set of “structured notes” as feedback, whereas the multi-level 
rubric provides a detailed checklist (p.79). Either, or even some hybrid combination of both, may 
be selected as appropriate to any given task, but I should note that multi-level rubrics more-easily 
lend themselves to statistical analysis, as they are already arranged in a gridded matrix of criteria 
and scores within those criteria. It is of course also possible to perform statistical analyses of 
pure scoring guide rubrics, but some qualitative data coding of the scored rubrics may be 
required first, requiring more additional time and labor to prepare for analysis than evaluatively-
comparable multi-level rubrics do. 
 It is plausible that scoring guide rubrics are better suited to assessing graduate student and 
creative work (S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012; L. Schrock, personal 
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communication, Spring 2012), but this is debatable (P. Hill, personal communication, Summer 
2012; S. Smith, personal communication Summer 2012). In practice, as to the form a rubric 
might most-usefully take, the deciding factor is typically the time-management of the assessor 
(A. Myatt, personal communication, Summer 2012). The literature is surprisingly tacit on this 
distinction and the relative advantages of either option, perhaps because it is a comparatively 
minor one best accommodated as a particular assessment context may individually require. I 
include this anecdotal finding from some of my interviewees here simply for completeness, and I 
note that general experience suggests that the multi-level rubric is better suited for use in 
situations where the instructor is not the grader – using the more-detailed format, it is 
theoretically possible to instill some basic quality control in an assessment process that relies 
heavily upon graduate assistants and/or teaching assistants to function as graders by providing a 
rubric that is detailed and explicit in its outcomes (and expectations) to both those who produce 
the work and those who grade the work. This then serves as a highly-germane instance of 
facilitating communication, as mentioned above. 
 One area of salient interest that Stevens and Levi only barely address is that of 
metarubrics (2005, p. 93). It is highly significant to program assessment that rubrics may be 
devised to assess the effectiveness of rubric use in learning assessment. In fact, rubrics may be 
devised to assess any and all administrative tasks, at any and all levels. Stevens and Levi gloss 
this point somewhat, but they do mention in passing that metarubrics are most-often employed as 
a personal tool to objectively evaluate one’s own rubrics and rubric use (also referenced in K. 
Schmidt, personal communication, Autumn 2012). Perhaps because they are pursuing a 
particular agenda in pitching rubrics as a program-level tool for individual students’ learning 
assessment, Stevens and Levi may overlook the value of the metarubric in program (and maybe 
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even instructor) assessment. This is a significant omission, however, inasmuch as rubrics at all 
levels of application strike a useful balance between academic freedom and 
curricular/pedagogical standards (A. Myatt, personal communication, Summer 2012, S. 
Flaschka, personal communication, Autumn 2012), and this is arguably the most important 
takeaway that rubrics have to offer. 
 As to the particular tasks to which rubrics may be effectively applied, perhaps the most 
relevant to modern educational goals is the student portfolio, or its contemporary evolution, the 
student electronic portfolio (Banta, 2006). As a historically-collected set of performance task 
artifacts, the portfolio is emerging as the leading candidate to augment, or even replace, the 
series of conventional examinations that have traditionally been used to assess student learning. 
Interestingly, the value of a portfolio as an assessment technology lies – perhaps unsurprisingly – 
in the emergent phenomenological ontology that the artifacts of the portfolio shape. Banta also 
notes: 
No standardized exam is truly content free, and if it were, it would be a better test of 
general intelligence than of what is learned in college. The near-perfect correlation of 
CLA [the Collegiate Learning Assessment] scores with ACT/SAT scores suggests that 
the CLA may be a better measure of the abilities students bring with them to college than 
of the learning they take away. (p. 3) 
Subsequently moving to a fundamentally qualitative perspective, the task for raters of portfolios 
then becomes one of evaluating the phenomenological ontology of the portfolio within the 
context of the desired leaning outcomes, rather than against some objectively-established 
content-based criteria. This perhaps daunting undertaking is therefore best attended to with a 
well-designed rubric that follows the guidelines I have set out above (following Terenzini, then 
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Stevens and Levi), approaching portfolio evaluation from the top down in terms of the need to 
assess student learning, but also from the bottom up in applied consideration of how those 
outcomes may best be captured in particular assessment criteria. I hasten to add however, that 
this shift in emphasis to looking at form-plus-content rather than content-by-itself for the 
purposes of qualitative assessment is not intended to suggest that quantitative, content-based, and 
even standardized, tests should be considered somehow obsolete, but rather that the recognized 
limitations of purely content-based assessments may be overcome using qualitative methods, and 
therefore a program may embrace and demonstrate a wider spectrum of learning outcomes – 
especially in the case of applied learning – than is reflected in the mere recall of discipline-
relevant facts. If the portfolio, as we may have been promised, is truly a “golden door” that opens 
onto insights into the depth, breadth, and scope of a student’s learning, then the rubric devised 
for assessing that portfolio may be thought of as the “golden key” that unlocks the door. This 
comprehensive functionality derives from the construct validity that forms an essential part of 
the assessment technology, as I will detail further below. 
 At this point, a concerned reader might raise the objection that the highly program-
specific nature of a well-designed rubric effectively precludes such a rubric being of much use 
outside the particular institutional department where it has been devised and applied. This is 
indeed a meaningful concern, as the entire process of designing and refining a rubric to match 
the specific learning outcomes of a specific context would appear to make the instrument too 
individualized to have relevance elsewhere. However, this is precisely why I assert that rubric 
design should be approached in accordance with the systematic, theoretical frameworks built 
from the models of Terenzini and Stevens and Levi: by relying upon a common conceptual 
framework as a starting point, and presuming that there is a more-or-less objective nature to the 
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content of any given discipline, highly institution-specific rubrics may still share a common 
phenomenology (from the rubric-building process) and a common ontology (from the established 
conventions of the discipline); the differences between any two different rubrics used in different 
institutions (but similar or corresponding disciplines) will be, upon deep inspection, merely 
cosmetic, provided there is some inter-institutional correspondence between designated learning 
outcomes. 
 Thus, although the rubrics as instruments in and of themselves may not have 
transferability, the process whereby they are devised, applied, and revised will. In this process-
oriented rather than object-oriented way, assessment that relies upon rubrics can serve the 
sometimes-incongruent goals of institutionally-individualized academic freedom and discipline-
based-standards of academic accreditation simultaneously. This benefit derives from the 
methodology behind the process of consistent assessment practice facilitated by suitable rubric 
use, and not from any particular, individual details of how the process is manifested from 
institution to institution. In other words, how we assess is evaluated in terms of the inter-
institutional, shared phenomenological ontology of the rubric-as-instrument, rather than a simple 
comparison of particular student performance tasks and their associated customized rubrics from 
one program to another. It should not be surprising that, given the emphasis on process (tasks 
that demonstrate applied learning, for example) that is typical of qualitative assessments in 
comparison to the purely objects-of-knowledge orientation (identification/recitation of facts, for 
example) that characterizes typical quantitative assessments, qualitative assessment can offer 
perspectives on student learning which are unique to qualitative technologies, but are 
universally-applicable to institutional, educational missions. Ultimately then, it is the 
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methodology of rubrics which is transferable, if the same cannot be said of any particular rubric 
in and of itself. 
The Question of Validity 
 This perspective on transferability, underpinned as it is by a theoretical notion, rests 
heavily upon establishing the validity of rubrics and their associated phenomenological 
ontologies for its own legitimacy and virtue. In his landmark essay on the subject, Messick 
(1989) defines validity as: 
…[an] integrated, evaluative judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence and 
theoretical rationale support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and actions 
based on test scores. (p. 13) 
I note that, especially for the present purposes, this definition should be construed as referring to 
an on-going process, rather than a static, one-off effort, and this makes it consistent with the 
continual re-evaluation process necessary for effective rubric use. Messick’s definition is focused 
on quantitative measurements in the tradition Brown (1996) further defines as “the degree to 
which a test measures what it claims, or purports, to be measuring” (p. 231). Given that the 
history of assessment validity has developed a mature theoretical model that relies heavily upon 
inferences about evidence of learning, and even in light of the contemporary aphorism that 
“measurement is easy, meaning is hard,” I contend that it is a straightforward (although non-
trivial) task to insert considerations of meaning into validity theory along lines similar to those 
which have been well-established for measurement, and that the necessary groundwork for doing 
so has already been laid out by validity theorists. 
 In addition, as my analysis relies heavily upon the fact that the notion of constructs is 
central to modern validity theory, I propose some operational characteristics, extrapolated from 
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the literature, to conceptually delimit the concept of a construct here. Borrowing from behavioral 
psychology – and momentarily setting aside my focus on phenomenological ontologies – a 
construct may be simply defined as a label used to describe behavior. This plainly non-rationalist 
definition is purely operational, but given that as educators we must rely upon empirical, 
objective technologies when performing assessments (and can expect to continue to do so unless 
some form of telepathic technology is invented that allows us to directly access student thought 
processes to look for evidence of learning), the non-metaphysical, non-mentalist model from 
behavioral psychology is useful in practice. From this behaviorist perspective then, the label 
“construct” refers to a not-directly-observed (or in the psychological vernacular, “latent”) 
characteristic of the subject (here, the learner). Typical examples of this are things like creativity, 
intelligence, reading comprehension, and beliefs. 
 The most important property of constructs that must be given due consideration is that, at 
least in the empirical sense, constructs do not have material-ontological status and thus do not 
technically exist in the objective, materialist sense of the word. This has given more empirically-
inclined researchers a great deal of difficulty (Slaney & Racine, 2013), but it should be noted that 
empiricism has always had trouble handling names (since empiricists typically deny the pre-
existence of the thing the name refers to, which can be highly problematical when dealing with 
real-but-non-material things such as numbers). This incidental point is not of much concern to 
my analysis, however; it is sufficient to take the label as behavioral psychologists prefer to use it 
at face value and, for the sake of analysis, allow it to have enough cognitive content to be taken 
as referring to something that emerges in the learner (either mentally or behaviorally, as one’s 
philosophy may see fit) that is constructed as a result of the learning process. It is this useful and 
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informative thing, the “construct,” that is then somehow to be measured by the assessment 
process. 
 In this way, it is not even strictly necessary to import the entire apparatus of a 
phenomenological ontology into consideration of a instrument’s (here, a rubric’s) validity; the 
process of evaluating validity may be performed from a purely-empirical (but perhaps not 
purely-materialist) perspective, and this point is crucial to establishing the objective nature of 
rubric-based assessments. Furthermore, the aforementioned reliance, detailed below, upon 
inference in establishing instrumental validity belies the inherent mental nature of the entire 
enterprise, empirical/materialist preferences, perspectives, and predispositions notwithstanding. 
 As originally considered by Messick (1980), test validity is theoretically conceived of as 
being a combination of three factors: 1) content validity, 2) criterion validity, and 3) construct 
validity. Content validity is concerned with the relevance and coverage of the domain under 
examination; i.e., whether the instrument addresses the subject area specifically and 
representatively. This is the most straightforward of the three, but is included due to its 
foundational importance: measurements should not be so indirect as to lack meaningful 
relevance. Criterion validity has two dimensions: predictive validity and concurrent validity. 
Together, these two give the test its predictive and diagnostic utility (within the relevant 
theoretical framework under examination), and by extension, the test’s reliability. However, by 
far the most complex and detailed of the three is construct validity. 
 Messick (1980) initially breaks this one down into a plethora of components: convergent 
validity, discriminant validity, trait validity, nomological validity, factorial validity, substantive 
validity, structural validity, external validity, population validity, ecological validity, temporal 
validity, and finally task validity. Ultimately however, drawing from his own research and that of 
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Cronbach (1969) earlier, Messick (1989) eventually moves to a unified conception of validity 
centered entirely around construct validity (Ruhe, 2002). This shift is made possible by further 
examination of what a construct is, and by subsequently extending and simplifying the definition 
of the term. Eventually, the unitary construe of construct validity emerges from the fact that there 
are many potential sources of evidence bearing on the appropriateness of inference(s) related to 
the construct of interest (Cizek, 1997). 
 In the modern vernacular of the American Psychological Association (APA) and the 
American Educational Research Association (AERA), “validity” refers to “the appropriateness, 
meaningfulness and usefulness of the specific inferences made from test scores” (APA, 
AERA/NCME, 1985). Here, the traditionally-quantitative notion of “scores” is inclusively 
defined by Messick (1989) “broadly to mean any coding or summary of observed patterns on a 
test, questionnaire, work sample[,] or portfolio” (Ruhe, 2002, p. 149). This usage then explicitly 
extends the concept of validity to purely qualitative assessments, while simultaneously providing 
guidance into how to apply it. 
 Validation practice is the collection of evidence used to assess validity (Ruhe, 2002). 
Traditional sources of this evidence include “measures of content representativeness, internal 
consistency[,] and reliability and correlations with alternate measures” (Moss, 1992, p. 245), 
whereas in recent years, these evidentiary sources have been expanded to encompass both 
performance assessment and social consequences to further assess the functional worth of the 
assessment and by extension, the treatment/learning (Messick, 1998; Ruhe, 2002). 
 Messick (1998) eventually resolves that: 
All validity is of one kind, namely, construct validity. Other so-called separate types of 
validity – whether labeled content validity, criterion-related validity, consequential 
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validity, or whatever – cannot stand alone in validity arguments. Rather, these so-called 
validity types refer to complementary forms of evidence to be integrated into an overall 
judgment of construct validity. What needs to be valid are the inferences made about 
score meaning, namely the score interpretation and its action implications for test use. (p. 
37) 
which, for my purposes, leads right back around to the importance of a good theoretical 
grounding for rubric design and use, rather than a mere mimicking of previously-effective rubric 
forms, to establish the parameters of meaning inside and outside the assessment context. 
 What eventually emerges from Messick’s theorizing is popularly characterized as 
Messick’s Validity Framework. This framework consists of a unified conceptualization of 
construct validity for test (I would prefer “technology” or “instrument,” in the case of a 
task/rubric combination) interpretation and use, and has three component dimensions (Messick, 
1995; Ruhe, 2002). The evidential basis for test interpretation is based upon the empirical 
analysis of all data used in construct validation and inter-construct relations. The evidential basis 
for test use also analyzes construct validation, but examines its relevance and utility to external, 
applied contexts such as social or vocational environments. Finally, the consequential basis of 
validity considers the value implications of score interpretation as a basis for action, and the 
actual and potential consequences of test use, especially as may regard sources of invalidity 
stemming from issues of bias, fairness, and distributive justice (Messick, 1980). 
 These last points require some further exegesis here. Modern educational theorists have 
extended this framework of Messick’s to encompass at least two additional analytical 
perspectives (Moss, Girard, & Haniford, 2006). In addition to relying upon educational 
measurement in the traditional sense as set out by Terenzini, validity theory is nowadays also 
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informed by hermeneutics and sociocultural studies. On the one hand, considerations of validity 
as depending on an epistemological understanding of the relevant phenomenological ontology 
grounds that approach in a basic philosophy of (here, social) science that addresses the nature 
and justification of knowledge claims. On the other hand however, this basic assessment context 
may be extended by “interpretive social science” (p. 110) to provide further relevant insights into 
the nature and extent of learning. 
 Historically, validation practice has focused on the intended interpretations of test scores 
in lieu of deconstructing the test itself (Moss et al., 2006). A more flexible approach to validation 
practice should be one: 
…that can develop, analyze, and integrate multiple types of evidence at different levels of 
scale; that is dynamic so that questions, available evidence, and interpretations can evolve 
dialectically as inquirers learn from their inquiry; and that allows attention to the 
antecedents and anticipated and actual consequences of… [the learners] interpretations, 
decisions, and actions. (p. 111) 
As validity theory evolved into a unitary notion of construct validity (Messick, 1989), it became 
increasingly important to understand the value implications of both score meanings and the use 
to which those scores were put (Moss et al., 2006). This is addressed in the first criterion of 
Messick’s Validity Framework as he offers considerations of sources of evidence for basic forms 
of hypothesis testing in establishing the basis for test interpretation. These proffered sources are 
many, but Shepard (1993) notes that there are legitimate objections to the characterization of 
validation practice as pure scientific inquiry. For one, allowing considerations of score meaning 
to precede considerations of the use to which the test is put undermines the objectivity of the 
validation inasmuch at such a practice prejudices the contextualization process and biases the 
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application of any theoretical frameworks that might be appealed to in establishing validity. 
Furthermore, when this approach is combined with the ongoing process of validity re-
assessment, such could incubate “the sense that the task is insurmountable” within the assessors 
which could in turn lead to shortcuts being taken in the rigor of the evidence-collecting practice 
(p. 429). 
 Although these concerns are addressed by the grounded-theory approach to rubric design 
and application that I am advocating, there is still room for extension and refinement. In light of 
the issues raised by Shepard in response to Messick’s methodology, Kane (2006) calls for a less-
abstract and more practical approach to validity theory built on two distinct, but complementary, 
kinds of arguments. First, Kane identifies the interpretive argument as one that straightforwardly 
sets out the various inferences and assumptions that lead from the observed task performance to 
the significance and meanings assigned to that task performance. From there, the validity 
argument uses logical reasoning and empirical evidence to evaluate the interpretive argument 
and each of its assumptions. Kane’s idea is that by explicitly elucidating the interpretive 
argument in a separate process, it protects considerations of validity from making implicit – and 
therefore potentially-inappropriate – interpretive assumptions by making lacunae or omissions in 
the evidence harder to ignore. 
 Kane (1992) helpfully lists and describes the various categories of inferences used in 
building interpretive arguments: 
• Scoring (or observation) inferences involve assigning some scaled, or at least relative, 
value to each performance or element of a performance 
• Generalization inferences extend the interpretation from the observed performance(s) to 
similar tasks under similar circumstances 
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• Extrapolation inferences extend the interpretation even further from the generalized 
performance domain into a “trait” being assessed 
• Implication inferences extend the interpretation to include verbal descriptions of scores, 
and claims or suggestions those descriptions might imply (“Average,” for example) 
• Decision inferences link scores to decisions or actions and their consequences 
(intentional or otherwise) 
• Theory-based inferences extend to interpretation to address (presumed) underlying 
mechanisms, properties, and/or relationships that account for the particular of the 
observed performance 
• Technical inferences address the appropriateness of assessor assumptions about technical 
issues such as the equivalence of performance forms, the extent of scaling, and the fitness 
of statistical models, techniques, and assumptions 
Of these seven (or perhaps six, as Kane is occasionally inclined to fold implication inferences 
into decision inferences and/or technical inferences at various times in his discourse), the first 
three – scoring, generalization, and extrapolation inferences – are involved in nearly all 
interpretative arguments, following Kane’s model (Moss et al., 2006). 
 Only with the interpretive argument firmly in place should we proceed to the validity 
argument, the purpose of which is to evaluate not the assessment per se, but the relevant 
interpretive argument of the assessment. Kane (2006) notes that some of the inferences of an 
interpretive argument may be taken for granted – such as “students can read the question” – but 
that others will need more careful evaluation – such as “the achievement test covers the content 
domain,” which Kane duly notes is nearly always questionable (p. 23). As a hardline 
epistemologist and systems analyst however, I am inclined to question each and every 
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assumption equally. In my experience it is unwise to assume anything about student ability and 
preparedness; sometimes it is the case that students cannot in fact read (with the expected level 
of understanding) the question, and to that extent, precursory remedial pedagogy may be called 
for. 
 Nonetheless, as Moss et al. (2006) explain: 
Consistent with its heritage in a naturalist or unified approach to social science, validity 
theory in educational measurement supports the development and evaluation of 
interpretations based on standardized forms of assessment that are intended to be 
generalizable – meaningful and useful – across relevant individuals and contexts. Validity 
research is conducted, in part, to ascertain the extent to which such generalizations may 
be warranted. (p. 118) 
Thus, if we understand the correspondence between the constructs grounding a particular 
rubric’s discrete criteria and the interpretive argument(s) that are foundational to considerations 
of an assessment’s validity, we have the basis for generalizing – and therefore implicitly also 
establishing the reliability of – an assessment technology. Reliability and generalizability may 
then be conceived of as being derivations of validity. I should note that this framework does not 
guarantee the converse dependency: reliability and generalizability do not in and of themselves 
yield validity. Reliability and generalizability may occur accidentally as a consequence of 
rigorous (re)design (as above in Harris, 1986); validity, however, essentially produces them, and 
therefore is more fundamental to the assessment process in general. 
 Returning to Messick’s Validity Framework then, if the evidential basis for test 
interpretation is the starting point for the validation process, the validation process should 
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subsequently turn to address, in order, both the evidential basis for test use and the consequential 
basis of validity. Moss et al. (2006) note that: 
…validity inquiries are always situated within a particular social context and guided by 
the problem, issue, or question one is trying to address and the available resources 
(evidence, conceptual tools) for addressing it. (p. 129) 
In addition to the aforementioned practices, this second-order process of situated inquiry 
examining uses and consequences may rely on hermeneutics and sociocultural studies, 
respectively. 
 Hermeneutics has its origin in textual analysis, but in recent years has been extended to 
cover pretty much any social phenomenon, including histories and cultures. “Hermeneutics is 
about the theory and practice of interpretation, about the bringing of understanding into 
language” (Moss et al., 2006, p. 130), and as such, it functions as a specific philosophical tool for 
analyzing phenomenological ontologies (as indeed might be expected, given that hermeneutics 
itself is an applied outgrowth of traditional phenomenology). Formally, hermeneutics is 
concerned with the “meaning” of a “text,” but that analysis extends far beyond mere 
considerations of the denotative cognitive content in instances of subject-predicate grammar. As 
a second-order consideration, hermeneutics also examines the particular vocabulary, usage 
conventions, implicit assumptions, values, author voice, and community standards of word 
choices and uses, paragraphs construction, and rhetoric. As a third-order consideration, 
hermeneutics also considers the intended audience and the social context which a “text” is 
presented to and within. Without digressing into more-granular detail here, suffice it to say that 
the conventions of hermeneutics represent another vetting tool that educators can use in the 
validation process, if desired. 
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 Likewise, sociocultural studies may be characterized as examining “relations among the 
person, activity, and situation, as they are given in social practice” (Lave, 1993, p.7). This broad 
definition may be concentrated in educational assessment to considerations of learning 
environment, community of practice, or activity system (Moss et al., 2006). Wertsch (1998) 
identifies the learning environment as encompassing “the relationships between human action, 
one the one hand, and the cultural, institution[al], and historical situations in which this action 
occurs, on the other” (p. 23). Lave and Wenger (1991) in turn describe (somewhat reflexively) a 
community of practice as “a set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in 
relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice” (p. 98), noting that the 
analytical tools are “artifacts – physical, linguistic, and symbolic” (p. 57). Finally, Engeström 
(1999) identifies an activity system as using some form of mediated activity (such as an 
assessment scenario) to “explicate the societal and collaborative nature” (p. 30) of the actions 
under examination. 
 All of these theoretical perspectives represent different approaches to the same, central 
undertaking of ascertaining meaning in assessment scenarios. To simply the framework 
somewhat, Messick (1989) helpfully provides a general summary of the process and relations, 
crossing them in two dimensions he refers to as “facets” of validity inquiry (p. 20) and 
reproduced here (adapted from Brown, 2000): 
Table 1. Messick’s facets of test validity 
 
 Test Score Interpretation Test Score Use 
Evidential Basis Construct Validity Construct Validity + Relevance and Utility  
Consequential Basis Value Implications Social Consequences 
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 The first facet (the columns) addresses the function/outcome of testing and therefore 
distinguishes between interpretation and use in the evidential basis for validity. The second facet 
(the rows) focuses on the justifications for testing, and therefore distinguishes between the 
appraisal of evidence and the appraisal of consequence(s) (Moss et al., 2006). In this matrix, 
construct validity is presented as defined by Messick (1989) to be the theoretical context of 
implied relationships to other constructs, whereas relevance and utility are defined as the 
theoretical contexts of (external) applicability and usefulness (cf. Brown, 2000). Value 
implications are defined as the contexts of implied relationships of performance scores to 
good/bad, desirable/undesirable, and similar judgments, whereas the social consequences are 
defined as the value contexts of implied consequences of test use and the tangible effects of 
applying the test. Messick notes that this matrix is progressive, in the sense that construct 
validity appears in each of the four cells, explicitly or otherwise. In this way, construct validity 
serves as the foundational, “integrating force” in validity inquiry (p. 20). 
 Given the highly context-dependent nature of even the most theoretically-grounded 
validation process, there is arguably no single best approach to evaluating construct validity. 
Brown (2000) gives a non-exhaustive list of suggestions that includes correlation coefficients, 
factor analysis, ANOVA studies, and mixed-mode studies, to name but a few. Since a program 
employing multiple analytical techniques to investigate construct validity can consume a 
significant amount of resources – especially time and money – is it fitting and perhaps ironic that 
assessment developers engaged in the validation process can benefit more from concentrating 
upon the quality of their inquiries instead of the raw quantity of such. The key takeaway here is 
that construct validation relies fundamentally upon assessors carefully drawing inferences – 
    80 
making an “informed leap” in each case from an observed, measured value to an estimate of 
underlying standing on a construct (Cizek, 1997). 
 Addressing the application of all this apparatus of validity theory to assessment praxis, 
Moss (2007) then asks the crystallizing question: “…what is being validated: a test, or an 
interpretation and use of test scores?” (p. 473). Lissitz and Samuelsen (2007) object to Messick’s 
argument that validity resides entirely outside of the test itself, concerned that Messick’s 
approach essentially ignores the context within which the test/instrument is conceived and 
constructed – yet the externality of validity is a position that Cronbach (1971) also champions: 
One validates, not a test, but an interpretation of data arising from a specified procedure. 
A single instrument is used in many different ways… Since each application is based on 
a different interpretation, the evidence that justifies one application may have little 
relevance to the next. Because every interpretation has its own degree of validity, one can 
never reach the simple conclusion that a particular test “is valid.” (p. 447) 
In this view, the test itself is not centrally important, as it is merely a tool to be used. How and 
why the test is used, and to what use it is put are the far more salient questions for validity theory. 
Therefore, appeals to the circumstances of an instrument’s source are considered to be either a 
form of red herring fallacy that diverts attention from consequences to origins, or a form of false 
cause fallacy that asserts an incorrect origin for the phenomenon (i.e., the validity of an 
instrument is in truth not specifically contingent upon its origin). This is a subtle point, and it has 
generated significant debate in the literature. As I see it, the confusion arises from the fact that on 
the one hand, it is essential to systematically approach the design of an assessment instrument in 
order to instill a predilection for yielding validity (and consequently reliability) in it, but on the 
other hand, validity can only be ascertained by a posteriori analysis and examination of the 
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instrument’s application. This, in my view, is precisely what drives the need to continually re-
evaluate qualitative instruments; no instrument (qualitative or otherwise, but especially 
qualitative) ever springs forth a priori fully-formed and perfect from its creator(s), and validity 
is, as a matter of practice, only ascertainable empirically and externally to the instrument, as part 
of the overall technology of an assessment program. The methodology I have presented above is 
intended to facilitate the development of valid qualitative instruments by design, but it can never 
effectively guarantee the validity of an instrument (here, a rubric) as such; the validation process 
will always require appropriate reflection and analysis after the fact. I am merely looking to 
streamline the process and not only reduce the labor input required in the assessment process, but 
also avoid what software engineers used to refer to as “Garbage In, Garbage Out” results in 
assessment programs. In effect, instead of offering simple checklist, by digging into the 
underlying theory and analyzing it with an eye toward application I am asserting that a 
systematic approach – as complex or simple as may be deemed appropriate by the stakeholders – 
is necessary for both success and efficiency in the assessment process, especially when working 
in the realm of the qualitative. 
Other Practical Considerations for Reliability 
 Beyond a firm and fundamental theoretical grounding in validity theory, reliability 
requires – in addition to an empirical, field-test-based program of revision – a well-designed and 
well-maintained process of calibration (Chun, 2010). In the context of assessment, calibration is 
an arguably unique criterion in that it is focused on those who are doing the assessing, rather than 
those who are being assessed or even the instrument used to assess them. Calibration provides 
the other essential component of reliability, as it provides a check, external to the assessment 
task the subject is performing, against the normative values the instrument scores against. 
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 For example, although a consistent phenomenological ontology is a presumed feature of a 
properly-devised and properly-revised rubric, calibration is necessary to ensure that different, 
individual raters apply that rubric consistently between different test subjects and over different 
groups and sessions (A. Myatt, personal communication, Spring 2012). Even experienced raters 
can become “rusty” within a short time frame (a week is often sufficient to degrade rater 
performance), and a few simple calibration exercises prior to a session of rating can quickly 
normalize the practice of scoring, whether raters are using a scoring guide rubric or a more-
detailed multi-level rubric (S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012). 
 Normalization from calibration is a necessary part of qualitative assessment applications 
to ensure scoring consistency absent the presence of a standardized quantitative structure to a 
rubric, yet the literature to address this issue is surprisingly sparse. On the one hand, this may be 
due to the implicit assumption (perhaps a typical one) that providing a scoring scale within the 
rubric itself is sufficiently-quantitative to guarantee a normalized structure to the assessment, yet 
on the other hand, as construct validity is not an explicitly-objective entity and requires empirical 
examination to confirm its presence, we have no unequivocal reason to expect such a guarantee 
to arise necessarily. Furthermore, given that it is human nature for an individual’s cognitive 
performance to vary over time as a result of both internal and external factors, prudence dictates 
that we take such variability into account when we undertake a rating session. 
 It is this variability (or less charitably, “fallibility”) among human raters that has driven 
recent research into using automated computer systems, employing various schemes of artificial 
intelligence and/or pattern recognition, to attempt to supplant humans in the role of raters/scorers 
for assessment programs. Unfortunately, these attempts to mechanize the process have yet to 
really demonstrate reliability (Stross, 2012; S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012). 
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Without delving into all the technical details, it is sufficient to note that the current approaches to 
automating qualitative assessment focus primarily upon textual essays and tend to rely upon 
statistical modeling of the text to evaluate the likelihood of the content being cognitively 
meaningful. Unfortunately, despite the enthusiastic optimism of its proponents, this approach is 
still easily “gamed” due to the inherent cognitive limitations of the model (Winerip, 2012). The 
problem arises not from the fact that the statistical modeling itself is somehow unsound, but from 
the fact that language, as per the theoretical perspectives mentioned above, is often (and easily) 
highly-charged with what is colloquially known as “meta-content,” in reference to all the 
contextual elements that give language (and language use) its full meaning, in the cognitive, 
phenomenological, psychological, sociological, circumstantial, political, and construct validity 
sense(s) of the word. For illustration, I have included a landmark example of this problem, 
recently written by Les Perelman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as Appendix C. 
Statistical modeling by itself alone is purely top-down, and cannot address the fundamental 
bottom-up requirements of construct validity as I have laid them out. As mentioned earlier in this 
essay, statistics can yield only measurement, not meaning, and some additional apparatus of a 
phenomenological nature is required for proper (valid, reliable, useful) qualitative assessment: 
also as above, the analysis of content is a separate and more-complex task than the analysis of 
form.5 Statistics are not, by themselves, inferences, and unless/until technologists can produce a 
                                                
5 This is a case of a “P versus NP problem” for computer science. Since construct validity 
can verified in polynomial time (by humans), the unanswered-at-present research question for 
software engineers and computer scientists is whether or not construct validity can be solved in 
polynomial time (by a Turing Machine algorithm, for example). For further background on this 
issue, see the historical survey in Auerbach (2012). 
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cybernetic, mechanized system to undertake this additional dimension of assessment, it will still 
fall to humans to supply the contextual analysis that gives insight into meaning, truth, and 
learning. 
 There are more practical alternatives to automated rating, however, to ensure 
calibration’s inter-rater reliability. Whereas specific measures of IRR may be quantitatively 
analyzed using statistics such as Cohen’s kappa (in the case of two raters) and Fliess’ kappa (in 
the case of two or more raters), or the broader Krippendorf’s alpha (comparing coded data to 
rated scores), the important point here is that such measures should be made possible by any 
given assessment program in the first place. In addition to having a basic, grounded validity, a 
qualitative assessment technology will provide the highest reliability when multiple raters assess 
the same performance task of the same subject(s) (Krippendorf, 1970; Krippendorf, 2004). 
Experience – and the existence of Cohen’s kappa as a distinct calculation separate from Fliess’ 
kappa – indicate that pairs of raters can provide an optimum trade-off in labor costs (typically, 
time rather than money) and scoring consistency (cf. López, 2002). Thus, raters performing 
qualitative assessments should ideally be grouped into randomly-assigned, then randomly-
reassigned-often scoring pairs, as this will tend to preserve the initial calibration of a rating 
session for the duration of that session (S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012). 
 This integrated approach to design, usage, and evaluation ultimately works because the 
reliability of a rubric lies not in the instrument itself, but in the raters and the inferences involved 
in its usage. 
 Concerns are sometimes raised and debates are sometimes sparked among assessors over 
the question of whether or not to provide students with access to a rubric before the students 
attempt the performance task. At issue is the potential problem of students specifically tailoring 
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their performances to meet the explicit expectations delineated in the rubric’s scoring levels. As I 
see it, the existence of such a perceived problem may be taken as being more indicative of some 
shortfalls in the alignment between the instrument and the intended learning outcomes than of a 
difference of perspective on pedagogy. If proper content validity has been pursued in the design 
and evolution of a rubric (as above), then what is really at issue here are the purposes to which 
the assessment/instrument is being put. 
 Although there are well-established pedagogical schools of thought that emphasize 
discovery processes and educational constructivism within the learner (which I endorse, as 
above), telling students what we want them to learn should not invalidate the assessment process; 
if it does, then the construct validity of the assessment instrument may be suspect, and revision 
of the rubric in use – or even the learning outcomes – may be called for. Only in cases of 
rigorously-applied Socratic Method do we find pedagogical scenarios and circumstances that 
leverage keeping the students in the dark at the outset into advantages for the intended outcome. 
Indeed, when students have the opportunity to provide feedback to those who have taught and 
assessed them, one especially salient, emergent theme is that of seeking to understand the 
expectations teachers have of them as students (Stevens & Levi, 2005; OECD, 2010). 
 Given the primacy of student-teacher relationships to the efficacy of the educational 
enterprise, we should be careful of undermining the essential trust in one’s mentor(s) that such 
relationships rely upon; as educators, it is generally not our purpose to conceal things from our 
students, except in those cases where self-driven-discovery is part of a pre-identified learning 
outcome. As assessment per se is not in and of itself a learning outcome, the only purpose 
concealing assessment criteria beforehand can possibly serve is another, perhaps tacit learning 
outcome. This second-order outcome is then the proper subject of a second-order assessment 
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once the second-order outcome is revealed. Theoretically, this compounding process could be 
repeated ad infinitum, but we would eventually expect the students to learn anticipate it (cf. 
“enlightenment”) and thus rob it of its effectiveness (which, of course, could serve as yet a third-
order learning outcome). In this way, when done correctly, initially obscuring the assessment 
criteria as part of a pedagogy derived from the Socratic Method can yield paradigm-shifting 
insights in the learner; overusing assessment-as-content-delivery, however, risks such a 
technology becoming detrimental to student engagement. 
Leadership and Management Considerations 
 Although I have not made the role of leadership explicit in the previous sections of this 
chapter, as I now move from an examination of the conceptual and measurement issues to turn 
my attention toward the organizational and political ones, as a practical matter, its role must now 
become central. From the organizational (and by implication, the institutional) perspective, the 
major issues for programs of qualitative assessment come down to ones of cost (Ewell & Jones, 
1985) and culture (Shipman, Aloi, & Jones, 2003), and addressing these issues necessarily 
expands the considerations more broadly outward from applied instructional practice, and thus 
embraces the more-immediate involvement of institutional administrators at various levels with 
the assessment process. 
 Barely one year after Ewell (1984) offers assurances that assessment does not require a 
“massive” increase in costs (as above), he acknowledges (Ewell & Jones, 1985) that there will be 
incremental costs involved in implementing updated, modernized assessment programs. 
Specifically, amid calls to “measure your mission” (p. 6) administrators of assessment programs 
must successfully address different cost considerations, some of them common to all 
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administrative programs (especially educational ones) and some of them unique to assessment 
processes (especially student-centric ones). 
 The most obvious of these varied concerns are the direct costs such as those associated 
with deploying a new assessment instrument and/or technology for any given assessment project, 
as well as those associated with the analysis of the results of that project. As with most itemized 
costs, these are largely inescapable, yet administrators need to properly anticipate and control 
them. It is this aspect of assessment projects that my analysis is most closely aimed at in the end; 
my theoretical model of what makes for “better” qualitative assessment is intended to facilitate a 
framework of methodological understanding that in turn allows assessors to realistically estimate 
the time, labor, and material that will be required, especially in contrast to legacy and/or 
traditionally-qualitative assessment programs. One of the key points that Ewell and Jones stress 
is that this cost represents a regular, ongoing investment, and not a one-time expenditure, and 
therefore assessment must be conceived of and understood as a continual process that adds value 
to the institutional mission, and not as an occasional, only-as-externally-required activity (p. 7). 
 Hand-in-hand with the direct costs are the indirect costs of implementation, and these are 
largely dominated by matters of overhead. Although Ewell and Jones (1985) do not address it in 
much detail, implicit in the framework of “overhead” is the notion of opportunity cost that may 
be measured in terms of faculty and administrative professional time spent on the tasks of 
assessment instead of other service/teaching/research activities. This investment choice extends 
to both the time spent on the analysis of specific assessments themselves as well as time 
subsequently spent on program reviews and revisions as a consequence of the results of 
assessment analysis. There is, not surprisingly, no straightforward, tested, theoretically-grounded 
formula appearing anywhere in the literature that gives either a simple rule of thumb or a precise 
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calculus of how to establish the parameters of either of these cost issues in an assessment-
specific context, and it is unclear if such a thing would even be useful; in practice, budgeting is 
more of an art than a science, and although each institution must weigh the costs and benefits of 
assessment for itself and in light of its own mission and intended outcomes, if the factors are well 
understood, the resource needs may be reasonably-well anticipated (Ewell & Jones, 1985). 
 For planning purposes, costs may be considered from three perspectives, each with a 
different analytical purpose. Full cost represents the total project requirements for all stages and 
elements, and is the last perspective to consider, as it directly affects budgetary concerns. 
Average costs represent per unit costs (e.g., per student, per faculty member) within the context 
of higher-order units, and typically inform variables used to calculate full costs. The most 
important perspective, however, are marginal or incremental costs (Ewell & Jones, 1985). 
Marginal costs depend upon the unit of analysis (per student, per faculty member, and here, even 
per program) much in the same way that average costs do, but are far more important to 
forecasting, as they may vary non-linearly. For example, economies of scale may provide very 
small marginal increases in cost when a technology is more-widely employed – once the host 
platform is installed and being maintained in operational condition, storing 100,000 student 
electronic portfolios will cost only slightly more than storing 100 of them – whereas the amount 
of staff time required to assess a large body of task outputs may incur increasingly-significant 
opportunity costs as other activates/responsibilities are progressively neglected – a faculty 
member can effectively and reliably grade a dozen or two term papers in a weekend without 
falling significantly behind in other duties, but a department will be unable to retroactively assess 
all writing samples collected from all sections of a core-curriculum course in the last five years 
and still balance a full semester’s academic workload without some outside assistance. A clear 
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understanding of the complexities of these matters and their consequences for resource allocation 
is essential to exercise effective administration over them. 
 To assist in that understanding, for accounting/budgeting purposes cost elements may be 
grouped into four distinct categories for consideration (Ewell & Jones, 1985). First among these 
are the costs of the instrument itself. In qualitative assessments, instruments are usually 
developed from within the institution (as per the guidelines I have set out above), rather than 
being externally licensed. As such, and as with all of these elements as applied to qualitative 
assessment programs, the costs tend to be dominated by considerations of the measure of faculty 
time involved. Unique to this particular element however is the fact that qualitative instruments 
require an ongoing investment of (human) resources to operate and maintain, given the necessary 
process of continual evaluation and revision that they require in comparison to the convenience 
of prepackaged, conventional quantitative, externally-acquired assessment instruments that 
typically incur either one-time or (occasional, depending upon licensing details) fixed-recurring 
costs. 
 Second in this consideration are the costs of administering the assessment. In the case of 
internally-developed instruments such as rubrics employed in a performance task assessment, 
this cost is fairly linear when scaled, and is usually allocated on a per student basis. For present 
purposes, it is most telling and germane that Ewell (1984) recognizes that all instruments 
intended to assess critical thinking are local in origin, as they are highly dependent upon context 
and curricular delivery. 
 Third are the costs of the analysis of the assessment, and this is the point where costs 
require the most management (Ewell & Jones, 1985). Analysis encompasses both the study of 
student performance with respect to the intended outcomes as well as examining the reliability of 
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the technology and considerations of potential revisions to the instrument and/or both the 
assessment and the instructional programs. Without effective management toward a clear set of 
goals, these activities can consume an ever-increasing, uncontrolled amount of resources, as well 
as produce diminishing returns on resource investment, and combined, this can constitute a 
highly-undesirable program outcome. 
 Fourth are the costs of coordination among all the program and institutional elements 
involved, and this cost is often the most underestimated. Again, insightful management is called 
for, as this element perhaps most of all is rife with potential for wasteful expenditures. To this 
point, Ewell and Jones recommend several administrative tactics to control the various costs 
associated with any assessment program that encompass all four of these budgetary elements. 
 At the outset of any assessment program, it is useful to begin by taking an inventory of 
what assessment data may already be already available on students, programs, and the institution, 
in order to avoid any needless duplication of previous efforts (and, I would add sanguinely, 
needless repetition of previous mistakes). This pre-existing assessment data may have been taken 
for a variety of (other) purposes, but is often not centralized nor indexed for easy availability. 
Studying this data can inform not only the administrative planning of the new assessment 
program, but can also shape its ontological structure, its sought outcomes, and its design and 
implementation details. 
 In addition to being a goal of the inventory process, good administrative oversight of all 
parts of an assessment program avoids duplication of effort, particularly between different 
institutional departments and divisions (or, in the vernacular, “units”). Although a bottom-up 
approach to qualitative assessment requires a decentralized structure to function correctly (as 
explained above), it is the proper role of centralized, top-down administration to maximize the 
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efficiency of concurrent programs across the institution. Modern leadership theory (discussed in 
more detail below) suggests that facilitating communication is a more-effective strategy in 
pursuit of this goal than taking a directly-controlling management role can be. The previously-
mentioned communicative value of rubrics is highly germane to facilitating this course, and can 
therefore provide an essential tool of intra-institutional (and inter-institutional, in accreditation 
contexts) consolidation of resources and data. 
 Complimentary to these two preliminary undertakings, looking for mutually reinforcing 
information is an essential task of program oversight, and one that may need to be driven by 
institutional administrators absent a vested interest by departmental-level assessors. This 
function is essential to the higher-level assessments of programs and institutions, but may also 
inform the revision of assessment technologies at all levels. 
 Finally, Ewell and Jones (1985) note that “Careful tailoring of data collection to 
instructional mission can limit costs” (p. 31, emphasis mine). Limiting the scope of assessment 
programs largely to specifically-identified needs prevents overtaxing the finite (human) 
resources of an institution, especially at the expense of scholarship and educational delivery. 
 Parallel to this budget-centric model, from the leadership perspective (focusing on 
principally personnel considerations rather than principally financial ones) Banta and Blaich 
(2011) characterize the process of effective outcome assessment programs in terms of three 
successive stages: planning, implementation, and improving and sustaining. In the initial 
planning stage, good leadership involves all stakeholders from the outset of the program in order 
to address their respective needs/interests in exchange for their later support of the program. 
 It is important for the planning stage, which should begin once the need for assessment is 
formally recognized, to allow sufficient time for a plan to be developed that has clear purposes 
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articulated and directly relates to the goals of the respective stakeholders. Establishing well-
defined, unambiguous, and explicitly-stated program goals is a necessary prerequisite to program 
success when large and diverse interests are involved. This is not to say that assessment 
programs cannot necessarily have open-ended goals, but the expectations for and values of such 
goals will need to be well understood by all concerned if they are to be realistically pursued. As a 
noteworthy aside regarding the specific issue of faculty involvement in assessment programs, 
Ewell mentions elsewhere that leaders should “remember that you don’t need everybody on 
board to move forward” (Hutchings, 2010, p. 3), and although this may be true in so far as it 
goes, prudence dictates that consensus is still highly desirable even when it is elusive or 
impractical (due to issues of resistance based upon individualized notions of academic freedom, 
for example; more on this below), and in practical matters of non-faculty externalities such as 
appropriation/grant/funding requirements, legislative mandates, governance directives, and the 
like, consensus with, and even among, external stakeholders may be an imposed prerequisite. 
 Banta and Blaich (2011) most extensively emphasize the role of leadership in the 
implementation stage of an assessment project. It is in the implementation that the details and 
complexities of an assessment project pose the most challenges to its success, and where 
maintaining the engagement of the various stakeholders – particularly the faculty – can be most 
difficult. To this end, helping everyone involved remain mindful that assessment is central to 
learning and is therefore in everyone’s interest, providing professional development 
opportunities for involved faculty and staff, and providing good communication among the 
various stakeholder constituencies can all become crucial to the efficiency and efficacy of the 
program. Likewise, good leadership also attends to the practical, technological needs of the 
assessment, placing responsibility at the unit (typically, departmental) level (and consequently 
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allowing units to exercise that responsibility) while also seeking to facilitate sufficient validity 
and reliability of the assessment (thereby ensuring its utility). Throughout this stage, leadership 
should likewise facilitate the assessment of processes along with that of outcomes, so that 
outcome assessment can also serve as program assessment. 
 Finally, leadership is essential in the ongoing process of improving and sustaining an 
assessment program, in terms of both the assessment technology itself, as well as that of the 
overall program. Even in cases where a program generates a large amount of enduring 
momentum internally without continual external motivation, leaders need to nurture even that 
process. 
 The single most important factor for leaders to address in assessment programs is 
engaging the faculty (Banta & Blaich, 2011). Governance issues notwithstanding, faculty 
engagement is the cornerstone of the entire assessment process, and without nurturing and 
securing it, assessment programs simply cannot be effective (Terenzini, 1989). Specifically, “If 
faculty do not participate in making sense of and interpreting assessment evidence, they are 
much more likely to focus solely on finding fault with the conclusions than on considering ways 
that the evidence might be related to their teaching” (Banta & Blaich, 2011, p. 24). Engaging the 
students follows as a close second (Banta & Blaich, 2011). Many, if not most, assessment 
programs are driven by accreditation concerns, and students, who are often already challenged 
by the need to engage with their institutions, may feel even less inclined to engage with external 
mandates presented to their institutions. 
 Less directly-relevant to issues of leadership, but even more important to my analysis, is 
the historically high turnover rate in faculty and administrative leadership that assessment 
programs are prone to (Banta & Blaich, 2011). Banta and Blaich report (or perhaps “lament”) 
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that “using evidence to promote improvements is not yet a core institutional function” (p. 26). As 
a consequence of this “churn” (again borrowing from the common vernacular) in leadership, 
assessment programs that are both long-running and successful are extraordinarily difficult to 
find examples of. This, finally, strikes at the root of the problem I pointed to in earlier chapters: 
assessment – particularly formative and summative qualitative assessment – must be improved 
upon somehow, even in light of internal and external factors that cannot be directly countered. 
 Furthermore, although Banta and Blaich (2011) are somewhat coy in addressing it, 
experience confirms that high turnover rates in leadership within the institution combine with 
short election cycles outside the institution to create immense political pressure on institutions to 
demonstrate short-term gains, even at the expense of long-term ones. The resulting unrealistic 
timelines for change driven by a persistent external insistence on “accountability” within the 
institution can lead to faculty frustration, resistance, and even outright rebellion (as above). This 
response in turn then fosters stronger calls for accountability as the next election cycle looms, 
and thus sows strife within the broader community of stakeholders, resulting in an increase in 
conflict rather than in communication. 
 It should be noted that it is also possible for assessment program administrators to lack 
the necessary professional confidence or decisiveness to implement assessment-indicated 
changes in curricula, pedagogy, and/or departments based on a (mis-)perceived lack of 
sufficiently ample and reliable data upon which to base expensive and perhaps unpopular 
decisions (Banta & Blaich, 2011). Sometimes, as a consequence of intra-institutional 9and even 
intra-departmental) politics, administrators may find it easier to suggest “further study” of a 
problem than to actually solve it – especially when one will be moving on in a couple of years 
anyway, and would therefore wish to avoid needlessly antagonizing one’s colleagues by 
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implementing unwelcome, assessment-driven changes to the status quo. This is not a prescription 
for a successful assessment program outcome, as it fails to address and resolve what is perhaps 
the single most formidable obstacle an assessment program may face. 
 Ewell (1984) anticipates this, however, and identifies two distinct motivations for faculty 
resistance: 
A first reason for resistance is a fear on the part of the faculty that they will be negatively 
evaluated. A second basis is more philosophical: a conviction that the outcomes of what 
they do in the classroom are inherently unmeasurable by anyone but the faculty. (p. 78) 
Ewell goes on to explain that part of the first problem stems from the tendency of the faculty to 
confuse/conflate assessments of program effectiveness with course or teaching evaluations – 
instruments that are widely considered to be highly prone to biases that make them unreliable. 
Therefore, for leaders in either the faculty or the administration, it is essential to place the focus 
of an assessment program clearly and unambiguously on the curriculum itself and nowhere else, 
involving the faculty intimately and from the outset by communicating and sustaining this goal 
to them and with them. 
 Ewell (1984) also notes that 
Faculty resistance based upon fear of negative evaluation is often heavily bound up with 
more basic objections to measurement of any kind. Many faculty are simply 
philosophically opposed to explicit outcomes measurement. They feel that it is inherently 
misleading, oversimplifying, or inaccurate. Moreover, many faculty believe that 
assessments designed to tap general attributes do not adequately reflect the specific 
emphases that the feel are present in their classrooms. (p. 79) 
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Here, then, the role of qualitative assessment through the mechanism of construct-valid rubrics 
may find its fundamental utility: providing meaning to learning and learning outcomes instead of 
mere measurement of them. 
 Ewell (1984) observes that teaching and scholarship are “fragile” practices that operate at 
their best within a decentralized and values-based context, insulated from an overarchingly 
instrumental environment (p. 13). In addition, he specifically asserts 
…that to achieve excellence in the diverse activities currently comprising postsecondary 
education, we must create explicit, institution-specific mechanisms for regularly 
assessing the degree to which we are in fact attaining our collective goals. (p. 13) 
Further on, Ewell consequently notes 
The challenge to [the] administration… is to create explicit, information-based structures 
of incentives and accountability to replace our more traditional implicit methods of self-
assessment and self-improvement. (p. 15) 
Ewell’s subsequent claim that the effectiveness of assessment programs “is highly dependent 
upon their being institution-specific and participatory in character” (p. 17) is much more in line 
with recent experiences reported in the literature. Ultimately, I think this last quote reveals that 
Ewell implicitly recognizes the necessarily “bottom-up” quality the assessment must have, even 
if he is couching his presentation from the administrative-managerial perspective. 
Faculty Matters 
 However, as alluded to previously, a major critique of higher education faculty, dating 
back to at least the 1970s, is their widespread, determined – even obstinate – resistance to change 
(Tagg, 2012). Tagg identifies a double standard, “in which quality only becomes a question 
when contemplating change and no comparative evidence ever emerges” (para. 6) that is often 
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used by faculty committees to terminate proposed revisions by citing undocumented concerns 
about maintaining a nebulous notion of “educational quality.” Thus, in perfect irony, preserving 
the assumed quality of a curriculum or pedagogy is often cited as a reason to oppose a new-and-
therefore-somehow-disruptive formal assessment of the quality of that particular curriculum or 
pedagogy. Naturally then, aspiring reformers should always couch their issues in terms of 
assessing how teachers can help students learn better, for this framing tactic is difficult to 
oppose in purely abstract or non-evidential ways. 
 Tagg (2012) advises would-be reformers that, because of the natural human proclivity 
toward biological and psychological homeostasis, change most often comes in response to 
external stimuli. Therefore, the implementation of a process of designed change – a change that 
deliberately alters the rules of an activity for some specific purpose – becomes necessary for 
facilitating reform (para. 12). 
 Tagg (2012) also observes that developments in psychology over last the one hundred 
years or so have led to the modern understanding that people do not make choices from a purely-
rational analysis that seeks the optimum outcome (i.e., John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern’s expected utility theory), but rather that people make choices based upon highly-
subjective perceptions of value (i.e., Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect theory) 
that are conceived of as relative gains or losses as measured from some chosen or provided 
reference point. Though I note that this process is especially prone to logical fallacies and 
therefore should not be considered reliable, it is unfortunately also a descriptive phenomenon in 
that is an observed default behavior in humans. As a direct consequence of this behavioral 
phenomenon, how choices are framed in terms of potential gains and losses can introduce a 
significant bias into how the decision of which choice would be preferable is arrived at. Whereas 
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semanticists might quibble over the specific phraseology used in some of the textbook examples 
provided by Kahneman and Tversky (2000), the general finding that people are risk-averse when 
choices and outcomes are presented in terms of gains, but risk-seeking when the exact same 
choices and outcomes are presented in terms of losses has been well-documented in subsequent 
research (see Tagg, 2012, for further background). 
 The leadership implications for educational reformers are then clear: faculty are only 
human, and presenting assessment programs to faculty as an opportunity for institutional gain is 
a recipe for failure, as naturally risk-averse mindset is likely to take hold within the faculty, and 
thereby give rise to a defense of the status quo no matter how unfounded such a defense might 
actually be. Once this mindset is in place, at least for American subjects, the Dunning-Kruger 
Effect can also come into play (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), causing the subjects to cling to their 
mindset even more stubbornly when presented with contrary evidence, out of fear of admitting 
(to themselves and others) that their initial reasoning was erroneous and of consequentially 
losing social and political capital within their peer group from this show of weakness.6 
                                                
6 There is some evidence reported in the literature of the Dunning-Kruger Effect being 
reversed in Asian cultures. In such cultures, social and political capital is often gained by 
promoting group harmony rather than by asserting dominance over the group, and therefore the 
sometimes highly-ritualized public admission of mistakes and errors – often requiring prescribed 
acts of contrition – is considered virtuous and valuable. See DeAngelis (2003) for more details, 
and note that the cultural implications of this difference extend to many leadership contexts, but 
that the main point regarding biases addressed from prospect theory and framing still holds 
across all studied cultures. 
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 In addition to this cognitive and social obstacle from prospect theory, Tagg (2012) 
identifies another psychological effect that operates as a corollary of loss aversion, pointing to 
what Thaler (1980) describes as the endowment effect. In essence, the endowment effect operates 
to tacitly and subjectively assign a higher value to things which the subject already possesses, 
further driving risk aversion even when risk may not be present, and in the extreme causing some 
subjects to embrace a net loss by choosing to keep what they have possession of even when they 
can be guaranteed to obtain something of greater objective value in exchange for it (Ariely, 
2008). Together, loss aversion and the endowment effect add up to what Tagg (2012) labels the 
status quo bias, borrowing from Kahneman and Tversky (2000) to characterize it as a perceptual 
illusion rather than a computational error. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) suggest the status 
quo bias results from an attempt to resolve the cognitive dissonance that may surround 
estimations of one’s own worth as a decision-maker, especially in light of the psychological need 
to justify past decision-making and resolve indications of past errors with the present self-
estimation of oneself as a good decision-maker. Thus, Tagg (2012) identifies the status quo bias, 
which can occur at any level of an administrative hierarchy, as the principle obstacle for 
designed change a the unit (here, the departmental faculty) level. 
Summary 
 All the component pieces for a grounded theory to improve qualitative assessment 
programs are now in place. From Terenzini, I have defined and delimited the fundamental 
parameters of assessment that form both its conceptual and pragmatic foundations. From Ewell, I 
have focused this framework upon modern educational contexts. From Stevens and Levi, I have 
qualified and examined the instrumental issues qualitative assessments face, as well as how best 
to address them in the integrated technology of rubrics, and from Messick I have delineated the 
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necessary basis for establishing the construct validity of those rubrics. I have subsequently 
looked to Kane and Moss et alia to further characterize the relevant inferences that may be 
drawn to give insight into construct validity within the context of institutional mission. Then I 
have looked to Ewell and Jones to examine and understand the nature of the costs associated 
with assessment programs. Finally, I have turned to Banta and Blaich to describe and explain the 
significant leadership issues that assessment programs face. 
 In the next and final chapter, I will bring all this together, with some further analysis and 
some additional considerations, into my conclusions and recommendations. 
  




CHAPTER 5: ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, GENERAL CONCLUSIONS, 
AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
Overview 
 We should never lose sight of the fact that institutional change is the implicit goal of 
assessment (Terenzini, 1989). To guide the institution of such changes, a general series of 
recommendations for leadership in assessment programs has emerged in the literature, both in 
the broader context of institutional management in any commercial or public scenario, and 
within the specific context of higher education. The checklist provided to postsecondary 
educators by Jones, Voorhees, and Paulson (2002) is a typical guide of this type, derived from a 
mixed-methods study relying upon interviews and statistical analysis and sharing a large 
commonality with the general professed wisdom on these matters, and so I shall use it as an 
exemplar. 
 Jones et alia (2002) describe successful assessment leaders as 
• being directly involved in the assessment process 
• meeting regularly with assessment personnel 
• facilitating communication 
• establishing mutual trust 
• promoting collegial collaboration 
• providing real incentives for program participation and support 
• fostering a deliberate planning process 
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• pursuing slow, incremental changes to maximize the potential for success 
• integrate assessment and budgetary concerns 
I note that none of these are particularly new to my analysis, but the crucial factor is that, as is 
usual for this type of advice, Jones et alia support these conclusions from the perspective of trial-
and-error “best practices” rather than a grounded theory. 
 By examining the details of how and why qualitative assessment works the way it does, 
considering the established challenges assessment programs pose for their leadership, and 
applying some systems theory I can now provide a more-specific phenomenology to facilitate 
qualitative assessment program success. 
Motivations 
 As leaders, when considering how best to motivate others, we should always take into 
account the others’ enlightened self-interest. Even the most altruistic of faculty members, the 
ones most inclined to serve the public good of education even at significant personal cost, cannot 
be expected to abandon the well-being of their careers completely. Central to this is the feedback 
loop that has emerged in higher education wherein faculty who devote more time to research and 
publishing are paid more than their teaching-oriented colleagues, and this brute fact holds across 
the entire spectrum of postsecondary education (Fairweather, 1996). The feedback loop arises 
because this discrepancy in emphasis inevitably has significant consequences for tenure and 
promotion decisions (Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006), and thus a classic vicious circle forms 
wherein teaching is systematically and continually devalued as a professional activity among 
faculty in higher education. Tagg (2012) notes that “teaching load” has even begun to take on a 
pejorative meaning, in that faculty increasingly view time spent on instruction as a net loss in 
time that could otherwise be spent on research. 
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 The only way to offset this shift is for administrators to pursue initiatives that emphasize 
excellence in teaching as being highly-relevant (or for the truly revolutionary, central) to tenure 
considerations. There are a few scattered examples of such initiatives that can be found 
referenced occasionally in the literature, but there is no evidence of widespread emphasis on 
such reforms trending across the overall spectrum of higher education institutions; to date, such 
initiatives appear to be the exception, rather than the rule (cf. Huber & Hutchings, 2005). This is 
the issue that administrators must address first and foremost if any assessment program – but 
most particularly a labor-intensive qualitative assessment program – is to be successful, or even 
possible as a practical consideration. All other issues regarding the improvement of qualitative 
assessment practices pale in comparison to the significance of this one. 
 In order to address this problem directly, it is necessary for administrative leaders in 
higher education to confront the settings wherein the mechanisms of tenure and promotion 
decisions principally reside in the loosely-coupled hierarchy that characterizes modern 
institutions of higher education: the discipline-oriented departments. Discipline-centric 
departments represent a double-edged sword academically; it may be viewed as scholastically 
advantageous that a community of researchers sharing a common professional specialization can 
work together under the appointed leadership of one of their peers toward the preservation and 
expansion of their particular, chosen body of knowledge, but emphasizing the necessary 
maintenance and advancement of their discipline and thereby themselves typically works against 
the faculty fostering a general public competency in (or even a serviceable familiarity with) that 
discipline through the mechanisms of education. Given the typical resource constraints under 
which faculty must function, and the self-reinforcing emphasis on publishing under which 
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faculty must survive, an “either/or” dilemma is created for the faculty in terms of how best to 
apply their energies, and the resulting choices are predictably discipline- and career-centered. 
 A further complication to this situation is that higher education faculty may often lack 
what I would describe as “sufficient” teaching experience, and may have only rudimentary 
pedagogical skills. This can often be the result of graduate education programs that emphasize 
the core competencies of research and publishing while leaving candidates to their own devices 
in terms of developing instructional proficiency. This emphasis then becomes self-reinforcing as 
successful academics subsequently carry this value system with them from graduate school to 
new jobs at new institutions, where they pursue and are eventually granted tenure, preserving not 
only the core knowledge of their disciplines, but also the traditional, scholarship-prioritizing 
value system. 
 Ultimately, Tagg (2012) describes the prevailing wisdom in departments regarding 
pedagogical improvement as “a morass in which gains would be invisible if achieved and in 
which [faculty] can only lose time, money, and energy through vaguely configured efforts that 
create no enduring value” (circa para. 47). I assert that it is therefore incumbent upon reformers 
to address these specific conceptualizations frankly, explicitly, and proactively, for no resource-
intensive program of qualitative assessment can succeed otherwise. 
 In the particular case of community colleges – and now, extended perhaps to the for-
profits – where faculty carry heavier (often much heavier) teaching loads in exchange for a 
release from research obligations, the single most valued resource instructors have is their 
autonomy (Grubb, Worthen, Byrd, Webb, Badway, Case, Goto, & Villeneuve, 1999; Tagg, 
2012). Even in cases of standardized curricula that are handed down to instructors who then 
function as little more than tutors and graders in practice, the freedom of self-determination in 
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instructional delivery forms a core value to these non-tenure-track faculty. Indeed, the more 
locked-down and standardized a pedagogy becomes, the more preciously each small remaining 
degree of academic freedom will be clung to, and each new encroachment is likely to be met 
with increasingly-determined resistance, as per Darling-Hammond (1997) above. 
 In the particular case of adjuncts and other contingent faculty, leaders need to weigh the 
increased inclination toward compliance with seemingly-capricious administrative directives that 
can typify adjunct working conditions against the comparatively high turnover rates these faculty 
members are prone to (from issues both inside and outside the institution’s control, which is a 
separate topic entirely). Although it can be easier to implement an ongoing assessment program 
when relying principally upon faculty who are less disposed than their tenure-track colleagues to 
stubbornly defend a status quo – since the extant culture barely includes those adjuncts in the 
first place – the accompanying high turnover rate among such faculty creates problems in itself 
for developing and maintaining the validity of qualitative assessment technologies. Without 
longitudinal participation from a steady quorum of expert faculty who themselves are directly 
involved in a representative sample of the instructional delivery, each new round of program 
assessment will essentially be starting over from scratch, and in the case of content-validity-
contingent formative and summative qualitative assessment, this may be an especially 
formidable obstacle to effectiveness as well as a major cost burden (Katz, 2010). 
 For administrative leaders, the key is to find ways to improve teaching and learning that 
do not significantly impact the traditional path to tenure and promotion. Such innovations must 
always be couched in terms that the faculty will perceive as not imposing a net loss upon what is 
professionally valuable to them. 
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Involving the Faculty in the Process of Change 
  Miller (2012) notes that there has been “a lot of backsliding” (p. 8) in higher education’s 
acceptance of the need to assess and improve teaching and learning. She notes that the key to the 
process is fostering “the curiosity of the faculty about the effects of their teaching” (p. 8). 
 Central to fostering faculty involvement in any change process is to establish ownership 
of the process among them, for any change (from any source, external or internal) must have this 
authenticity in order to be accepted (Ewell, 1984; Senge, 1990, Tagg, 2012). Among leadership 
gurus, an apocryphally-sourced quote attributed to 20th Century author Antoine de Saint-
Exupéry is frequently invoked to illuminate this cornerstone notion of modern leadership theory: 
“If you want to build ship, don’t drum up people to collect wood and don’t assign them tasks and 
work, but rather teach them to long for the endless immensity of the sea.” 
 Whereas it is perhaps overreaching to expect higher education faculty to ever “long” for 
the emergence and growth of an institutional assessment culture that is dedicated to the 
improvement of postsecondary teaching and learning, the essential, cornerstone question 
remains: How does one foster and promote faculty involvement in, and ownership of, qualitative 
assessment? 
 Tagg (2012) calls for an opening-up of the traditional faculty endowments – the vested 
interests that serve as repositories of resources and value. The traditional linking of hiring, 
promotion, and tenure decisions to disciplinary research needs to be, if not broken, at least 
augmented with alternative linkages that do not undervalue teaching and learning and therefore 
do not deter the faculty embrace of change. In addition, linking these same faculty endowments 
to collaborative work instead of individual work will enable the faculty to perceive such work as 
a gain in their respective endowments instead of a loss. Tagg also recommends that this 
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collaboration be as large as possible, so that faculty involvement in the change process may be as 
widespread and extensive as possible. To facilitate all of this, it is helpful to establish channels 
outside of departments that allow faculty to build their endowments; the reasoning being that 
modern institutional departments reinforce specialized research and individual autonomy, but if 
these are the only paths for faculty development and endowment-building, they drive rigidity and 
resistance to change. 
 All this sounds simple and straightforward enough, but the specifics are often elusive, 
and there are other factors that these optimistic prescriptions for change seem to ignore. 
Foremost among these is The Peter Principle (Peter & Hull, 1969). Simply stated, The Peter 
Principle is the descriptive phenomenon that in a bureaucratic hierarchy, employees tend to rise 
to the level of their incompetence. In practice, this means that employees – administrators in 
particular – are typically promoted and assigned new responsibilities within an institution based 
on their performance at the previous level of the hierarchy, rather than based on a demonstrated 
aptitude for the new level of responsibility. Once an employee reaches a job level exceeding that 
employee’s functional capabilities, promotion of the employee ceases, and the employee remains 
in the hierarchy, attempting to function at a level beyond his or her abilities. 
 In the years since The Peter Principle was first popularized among management theorists, 
little has been done to avoid it or alleviate the problems it creates. Indeed, the principle has now 
been informally extended (by Laurence J. Peter himself) from personnel contexts into to 
technological ones: The Generalized Peter Principle asserts that any working technology will 
tend to be applied to progressively more challenging applications until it fails. Unlike personnel 
scenarios, wherein employees may be retained in unsuitable positions (particularly in situations 
where their incompetence protects those above them from having their own incompetence 
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revealed), technology that is inadequate to a new application may often be discarded, rather than 
simply being retained while remaining ineffective. 
 To address this from the perspective of qualitative assessment program leadership, 
leaders must confront The Peter Principle in both its forms. From the human resources side, 
although it is often preferable in non-postsecondary-education context to provide comfortably-
competent employees with salary increases instead of promotions, this is seldom suitable for 
rank-conscious higher education faculty. The alternative solution then becomes essential: 
employees must receive extensive training for new responsibilities prior to taking on those 
responsibilities, so that any emergent incompetencies may be identified before the employee 
(faculty member) is allowed to take on such new responsibilities. This crucial point is not 
generally addressed in the advice to be found in the literature, as it clearly will increase the 
resource costs necessary for implementing an assessment program, and yet, it appears to me to 
be as essential to planning as any other item – arguably even more so if leaders want to facilitate 
engagement with and ownership of the resource-intensive qualitative assessment process. As 
faculty may often lack experience with qualitative assessment, it is vital to any program that 
faculty be provided with the opportunity to first understand the technology, so that they may 
consequently best consider how to implement, use, and draw inferences from it. 
 One of the most-often reported benefits of the assessment projects we run in the Ole Miss 
Center for Writing and Rhetoric is giving hands-on, practical familiarity with using rubrics to our 
graduate instructors. These instructors may have been exposed to rubrics when their own work 
was previously graded using them, and they are guided to use rubrics in assessing their own 
students’ learning, but these novice instructors are frequently impressed by how rubrics may also 
be used in the overall program assessment we engage in regularly, and participation in that 
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process expands and extends their understanding of the technology considerably. In effect, we 
provide training in rubric use for program assessment that has benefits to our individual 
instructors’ student assessments. Once we can persuade (with modest financial incentives) our 
graduate students to invest the time in our program assessment, they are usually very interested 
in participating in any future program assessment projects that are subsequently announced – not 
merely for the small amount of extra money in their paychecks, but for the professional 
development opportunity it provides. 
 The technological problem arising from the Generalized Peter Principle is simpler to 
resolve than the more-basic, personnel-based one. Maintaining the validity of a qualitative 
assessment technology (a rubric and its inferences) is already built in to the process of evaluating 
and revising the rubric, and therefore it is a simple matter to evolve a rubric (or a rubric-based 
program or institutional assessment) to meet any additional requirements or to examine 
additional outcomes. The technology of rubric-based assessment never becomes obsolete. 
 When attempting to implement the leadership recommendations I have set out above, it 
will be helpful for leaders to additionally bear in mind two opposing, yet compatible, models to 
guide specific decision-making. The first of these is General Systems Theory (Von Bertalanffy, 
1972). It is essential that leaders consider assessment programs from the perspective of systems 
theory: a program should always be considered as an interconnected series of parts, each one of 
which may affect any other part or even the functioning of the system as a whole. On the one 
hand, this is the basis for the modern notion of a learning organization (Senge, 1990) which 
seeks to leverage the skills and abilities of an institution’s members between and across the 
divisions of the entire organization in an effort to maximize outcomes, but on the other hand, it 
means that every decision to be implemented is likely to have repercussions anywhere and 
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everywhere else within the project and the institution, and must therefore be understood in terms 
of its place within the broader context. Although this task may be non-trivial, it is my aim to 
have provided, in the previous chapters, the basis for both contextual and theoretical frameworks 
to facilitate this analysis. 
 Foremost among these is the other principle that I recommend be used to guide decision-
making: subsidiarity. Subsidiarity, especially as incorporated into European Union law, is the 
principle that any organizational matter is best handled by the lowest, least-centralized level of 
the organizational hierarchy that can effectively address that particular matter. As a demonstrated 
precondition for effective qualitative assessment, bottom-up methodologies are required to 
establish the content validity of rubric-based technologies of assessment. As a prerequisite for 
program success, faculty engagement with and ownership of the process of assessment – 
particularly resource-intensive qualitative assessment – is likewise crucial. The piece of advice to 
administrators that I find missing in the literature is that pushing authority for decision-making as 
far down the institutional hierarchy as it can functionally go is a tacit requirement for program 
success, and is therefore and essential administrative philosophy. Not only does this reinforce the 
tradition of shared governance when applied to higher education institutions, but it can guide 
administrative processes beyond outcomes assessment. 
Metarubrics 
 Finally, administrators should never lose sight of the fact that rubrics may be employed at 
all levels of an assessment program, and may even be used to assess the effectiveness of other 
rubrics. Using the methodological, conceptual, and managerial frameworks I have set out, a 
rubric may be designed, used, and validated for any definable outcome at any institutional level. 
The more pervasive rubric use becomes, not only inside the classroom, but at all levels of the 
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institution, the more opportunities to understand meaningful higher education outcomes will be 
created. 
Final Perspective 
 Ultimately then, effective qualitative assessment is the result of effective rubrics being 
combined with effective leadership and program management, and the importance of each of 
these elements to the overall success of a qualitative assessment program cannot be understated. 
Overall, for professional and intuitional development purposes, I have sought in this research to 
solve the mystery of why qualitative assessment technologies are not as widespread as a 
postsecondary educator might naïvely expect them to be, and thereby gain some insight into 
rectifying the situation in a manner that improves educational delivery. In so doing, I have 
identified what are, at least to me and my perspective yet hopefully to others’ as well, useful and 
informative frameworks – both practical and theoretical – that have already demonstrated their 
utility to the administrative challenges I have found myself grappling with regularly in support of 
program assessment, especially as it is pertinent to institutional accreditation concerns. 
 Unguided research of the type upon which I have relied heavily in this study can itself be 
a highly resource-intensive process, and I am fortunate to have been able to negotiate my way 
into an opportunity to pursue my investigations at length. Going forward, it is now incumbent 
upon me to promote and extend my findings. Rubrics are the easy part; I have found that the 
mechanisms of effective rubric use are well-established, but the knowledge of how to use them 
effectively is not, and therefore the need for dissemination of that knowledge is clear to me. It is 
the leadership challenges that are the hard part of qualitative assessment; promoting and 
facilitating faculty engagement with, and ownership of, the technologies of qualitative 
assessment is a major task, but now that I have constructed at least a rudimentary map of the 
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terrain, further research into how to most effectively accomplish this objective should have a 
reliable model and direction upon which to build. 
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Appendix A 
INFORMATION SHEET AND 
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
Information about a Dissertation Research Study 
Title: Improving Qualitative Assessment in Higher Education 
Investigator 
Chad W. Russell 
Department of Leadership and Counselor 
Education 
120 Guyton Hall 




Lori A. Wolff, Ph.D., J.D. 
Department of Leadership and Counselor 
Education 
139 Guyton Hall 




We seek to identify and understand best practices in qualitative assessment within higher 
education. Specifically, we want to investigate the professional experiences and perspectives of 
educators and administrators who report, or are reported to have had, successful and/or valuable 
experiences in the innovation and/or application of qualitative assessment methods and 
methodologies in higher education contexts. 
In order to investigate this issue, we are inviting you to take part in the research. Your voluntary 
participation would consist of a guided interview to both describe and explore the meaning of 
your experience(s) with qualitative assessment. The interview will consist of some initial, pre-
written questions to frame your experience within the same general context as that of other 
interviewees, and then some open-ended follow-up questions to give you an opportunity to 
provide further details as you may think are relevant. A list of the pre-written interview questions 
can be provided prior to the interview, if you request it. Ask us, at any point, if there is anything 
about this research that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take the time to 
decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
Risks and Benefits 
You will be interviewed in your professional capacity as an educator and/or an administrator, 
and therefore may expect and enjoy an appropriate degree of academic freedom in your 
response. You may be identified not only by name, but also by institutional title and position in 
the published research, which may be a risk or a benefit, depending on your perspective. 
Cost and Payments 
The basic interview should last no more than 30 minutes; the length of any open-ended follow-
up elaborations will be determined by the mutual consent of both you and the interviewer. 
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Participation in this study is a purely voluntary service, and will be without particular 
remuneration. 
Confidentiality 
You may be identified by name, title, and position, as appropriate, in the published research. The 
recording of your interview will remain the personal property of the investigator, but the 
transcript of the interview (annotated, coded, or otherwise) may be published as an appendix to 
the dissertation. If you request confidentiality at any point or on any issue, the request will be 
respected, but this may limit the usefulness of your responses to the research. 
Right to Withdraw 
You do not have to take part in this study. If you start the study and decide that you do not want 
to finish, all you have to do is to tell Chad Russell (or Lori Wolff) in person, by letter, by e-mail, 
or by telephone at the Department of Leadership and Counselor Education, 120 Guyton Hall, 
The University of Mississippi, University MS 38677, or (662) 236-4020. You may withdraw 
from this study at any time prior to its acceptance for publication at no penalty. The interview 
data of participants who withdraw will not be published nor shared with third parties, and it will 
be destroyed at the conclusion of the investigation. 
The researchers may terminate your participation in the study without regard to your consent and 
for any reason, such as protecting your safety and protecting the integrity of the research data.  
 
IRB Approval 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). The IRB has determined that this study fulfills the human research subject protections 
obligations required by state and federal law and University policies. If you have any questions, 
concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a participant of research, please contact the IRB at 
(662) 915-7482, regarding Ole Miss IRB protocol 11-120. 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the above information. I have been given a copy of this form. I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions, and I have received answers. I consent to participate in the study, 
and to have the information I provide published as part of the dissertation research. 
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Appendix B 
Initial Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews — Protocol for Questions 
(Designed for use in face-to-face, telephonic, and correspondence interview formats.) 
 
[Begin with noting the time, date, place, and purpose of interview. Identify self and purpose of 
interview, including specific qualitative assessment method being investigated. Identify and 
thank interviewee.] 
1. For the record and in your own words, please state your name and position/title. 
 1a. What is your background in assessment? 
2. What can you tell me about [qualitative assessment program/instrument/experience being 
investigated] in general? 
 2a. How did it and/or its use come about? 
  2a1. Why was the purpose behind implementing it? 
 2b. What was/is your involvement with it? 
 2c. What were the results/outcomes of it? 
  2c1. Was it a one-time trial, or is it ongoing, and why? 
  2c2. Has it been modified or replaced, and why? 
 2d. What was/is the value of it? 
  2d1. To your institution? 
  2d2. To your program/division? 
  2d3. To your colleagues? 
  2d4. To the students? 
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3. What is your professional opinion of [program/instrument/experience] as a method of 
qualitative assessment? 
 3a. Do your colleagues share this opinion, or not? 
 3b. What sort of feedback did you receive? 
  3b1. From colleagues? 
  3b2. From students? 
  3b3. From accreditors? 
4. What do you think of qualitative assessment both in and of itself, and in contrast to 
quantitative assessment? 
 4a. What is the purpose of assessment? 
  4a1. For educators? 
  4a2. For institutions? 
  4a3. For students? 
  4a4. For other stakeholders? 
 4b. How would you characterize the difference(s) between qualitative and quantitative 
assessment in meeting these goals? 
5. What was/is the most important thing gained from your experience with [qualitative 
assessment program/instrument/experience]? [Open-ended; may require follow-up.] 
 5a. Is there anything else about the history, design, features, and/or outcomes of your 
experience that you would like to mention or elaborate upon? [Open-ended; may require follow-
up.] 
6. What recommendations do you have, or did your institution generate, as a result of using this 
particular qualitative assessment? [Particularly open-ended; may require extensive follow-up.] 
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7. Is there anything else you would like to add that you think is relevant to the research? [Open-
ended; may require follow-up.] 
[Thank interviewee, note time.] 
  
























APPENDIX C: PERELMAN ESSAY  
    136 
 
Appendix C 
The following is an essay question response written by Les Perelman and awarded a top 
grade of 6 by e-Rater, the automated grader developed by ETS. This is believed to be a verbatim 
transcription of a timed-writing original, and any typographic errors – unintentional or otherwise 
– are therefore preserved here. 
 
Question: “The rising cost of a college education is the fault of students who demand 
that colleges offer students luxuries unheard of by earlier generations of college students—single 
dorm rooms, private bathrooms, gourmet meals, etc.” 
Discuss the extent to which you agree or disagree with this opinion. Support your views 
with specific reasons and examples from your own experience, observations, or reading. 
 
Response: In today’s society, college is ambiguous. We need it to live, but we also need 
it to love. Moreover, without college most of the world’s learning would be egregious. College, 
however, has myriad costs. One of the most important issues facing the world is how to reduce 
college costs. Some have argued that college costs are due to the luxuries students now expect. 
Others have argued that the costs are a result of athletics. In reality, high college costs are the 
result of excessive pay for teaching assistants. 
I live in a luxury dorm. In reality, it costs no more than rat infested rooms at a Motel Six. 
The best minds of my generation were destroyed by madness, starving hysterical naked, and 
publishing obscene odes on the windows of the skull. Luxury dorms pay for themselves because 
they generate thousand and thousands of dollars of revenue. In the Middle Ages, the University 
of Paris grew because it provided comfortable accommodations for each of its students, large 
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rooms with servants and legs of mutton. Although they are expensive, these rooms are necessary 
to learning. The second reason for the five-paragraph theme is that it makes you focus on a single 
topic. Some people start writing on the usual topic, like TV commercials, and they wind up all 
over the place, talking about where TV came from or capitalism or health foods or whatever. But 
with only five paragraphs and one topic you’re not tempted to get beyond your original idea, like 
commercials are a good source of information about products. You give your three examples, 
and zap! you’re done. This is another way the five-paragraph theme keeps you from thinking too 
much. 
Teaching assistants are paid an excessive amount of money. The average teaching 
assistant makes six times as much money as college presidents. In addition, they often receive a 
plethora of extra benefits such as private jets, vacations in the south seas, a staring roles in 
motion pictures. Moreover, in the Dickens novel Great Expectation, Pip makes his fortune by 
being a teaching assistant. It doesn’t matter what the subject is, since there are three parts to 
everything you can think of. If you can’t think of more than two, you just have to think harder or 
come up with something that might fit. An example will often work, like the three causes of the 
Civil War or abortion or reasons why the ridiculous twenty-one-year-old limit for drinking 
alcohol should be abolished. A worse problem is when you wind up with more than three 
subtopics, since sometimes you want to talk about all of them. 
There are three main reasons while Teaching Assistants receive such high remuneration. 
First, they have the most powerful union in the United States. Their union is greater than the 
Teamsters or Freemasons, although it is slightly smaller than the international secret society of 
the Jedi Knights. Second, most teaching assistants have political connections, from being 
children of judges and governors to being the brothers and sisters of kings and princes. In Heart 
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of Darkness, Mr. Kurtz is a teaching assistant because of his connections, and he ruins all the 
universities that employ him. Finally, teaching assistants are able to exercise mind control over 
the rest of the university community. The last reason to write this way is the most important. 
Once you have it down, you can use it for practically anything. Does God exist? Well, you can 
say yes and give three reasons, or no and give three different reasons. It doesn’t really matter. 
You’re sure to get a good grade whatever you pick to put into the formula. And that’s the real 
reason for education, to get those good grades without thinking too much and using up too much 
time. 
In conclusion, as Oscar Wilde said, “I can resist everything except temptation.” Luxury 
dorms are not the problem. The problem is greedy teaching assistants. It gives me an 
organizational scheme that looks like an essay, it limits my focus to one topic and three subtopics 
so I don’t wander about thinking irrelevant thoughts, and it will be useful for whatever writing I 
do in any subject.1 I don’t know why some teachers seem to dislike it so much. They must have 
a different idea about education than I do. 
By Les Perelman 
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